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Changing Minds:
The Work of Mediators and Empirical Studies of
Persuasion
James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Take this case: Diana Halverson, age fifty-nine, worked for eleven years
as an office manager in the Hartford, Connecticut office of TSG Corporation,
an East Coast manufacturer of seamless gutters. Sixteen months ago, she was
denied a promotion for which she applied—a mid-level managerial position
at the company’s corporate headquarters in Philadelphia. The job went to a
more recently hired male employee in his late thirties, on the ground that his
“potential was greater.” Ms. Halverson, feeling that she had an excellent
work record, was hurt and offended. Needing her job, however, she bit her
tongue. But when soon thereafter that job was eliminated in an administrative
reorganization, she consulted a lawyer and, with his assistance, filed a charge
of age and gender discrimination with the state human rights commission.
The company responded to these allegations with a blanket denial of all
charges, claiming that its decisions were lawful and justified by legitimate
business considerations. When contacted by the agency several months later
to see whether this matter might be mediated, both parties accepted the
invitation.
You are a private mediator who handles approximately eight to ten
employment discrimination cases per year on assignment by the human
rights commission. You have been assigned to mediate this matter.
The pleadings, exchanged documents, and early summaries by counsel at
the outset of the mediation revealed the following: (1) the claimant’s
∗ James H. Stark is a Professor of Law and Director of the Mediation Clinic at the
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previous work evaluations were all positive to very positive, but the
evaluations of the male employee who got the promotion were quite positive
as well; (2) the two supervisors most directly responsible for the decisions
adversely affecting the claimant had been overheard on a number of
occasions in the past three years making overtly sexist remarks, though in
informal rather than formal work settings and not directed at the claimant;
and (3) cursory analysis of several documents pertaining to the
administrative reorganization is somewhat suggestive of age and gender
discrimination, though the reorganization itself seems legitimate, given tough
economic conditions resulting from a plummeting housing market. Ms.
Halverson’s case, in other words, appears plausible on its face, but it is
anything but a slam dunk.
During a pre-mediation phone call with claimant’s counsel, you learned
that in the twelve months since she was laid off, she was able to secure
various odd jobs but has been unable to find comparable full-time
employment. The strong sense you got between the lines from claimant’s
counsel is that Ms. Halverson has financial problems and (assuming that the
company cannot or would not re-hire her) would like to resolve the dispute
now if some quick money could be obtained. In a separate conversation with
the other side, defense counsel revealed that the company is self-insured for
this claim and took the same hard line position reflected by the pleadings,
denying any liability and calling the complaint a “bunch of junk.”
At the mediation, the following people are present: the claimant; her
lawyer; Jason Hernandez, the claimant’s former immediate supervisor;
Sharon Stern, TSG’s human resources director; and outside counsel for the
company. On being invited by you to state her side of the case, the claimant’s
lawyer lays out a twenty-minute summary of the facts and the law that
supports her liability and damages claims, demanding “$150,000 to resolve
this.” When you ask the claimant if she has anything to add, she provides an
emotional account of her employment history, weeping openly while
recounting the early days of the job and how gratifying it had been. She also
describes how degrading it was to be laid off after so many years of loyal
service with nothing more than an impersonal email that explained the
financial conditions prompting the reorganization and gave her just one
week’s notice.
At this point, the company’s attorney apologetically interrupts, telling
you that: “We, of course, could offer a different view of all of this. We could
focus, for example, on the display Ms. Halverson put on at the office when she
was passed over for the promotion she says was ‘rightfully hers.’ In front of
several work colleagues, she made nasty and unprofessional personal
comments about her supervisors. But perhaps we can make some progress if
264
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we try to deal with the legal and monetary issues instead of rehashing
contested allegations.” At this point, the lawyer reiterates at length the
company’s denial of any unlawful intention or action and summarizes the
justifications for its decisions. At the end of her presentation, defense counsel
makes a $15,000 (“nuisance value”) settlement offer. Claimant’s counsel
immediately rejects this offer as “insulting.” You ask the human resources
director and the claimant’s supervisor if either has anything to add. Both
shake their head no.
Now, almost an hour into the mediation, the claimant is fuming and the
emotional climate in the room has deteriorated badly. You decide to hold a
round of caucuses and to meet first with the company’s representatives and
their lawyer.
In thinking about how you might try to persuade the defendants to
become more flexible in their view of the situation or negotiating position,
you have identified the following possibilities:
(A) ask the company’s representatives or counsel to try to articulate how
the situation looks from the claimant’s point of view;
(B) ask the claimant’s supervisor in confidence whether there is anything
about his or the company’s conduct or the situation that he regrets, and if the
answer is yes, encourage him to express that to the claimant when the
process continues;
(C) instead of telling them your views, ask the defense representatives
questions that suggest your views of the company’s potential liability in the
dispute in order to get them to assess the costs and benefits of not reaching a
mediated settlement; or
(D) ask the supervisor, human resources director, or both how it would
feel if a large trial verdict for Ms. Halverson were to necessitate laying off
other employees.
These persuasion choices (and many others) present themselves to
mediators every day in virtually every dispute. Which of these options strike
you as likely to be effective? None? All? If all, and time is limited, in what
order would you attempt these interventions? Why?
As Alan Tidwell has pointed out, merely by entering a conflict, neutrals
inevitably bring some degree of influence to bear on it.1 Their presence in the
mediation room, the questions they ask or don’t ask, the statements they
make, the agenda they help to create—all of these can and do affect how the
parties communicate and the results they achieve. But while mediator
influence may be unavoidable, it is the deliberate exercise of influence that is
1 Alan Tidwell, Not Effective Communication but Effective Persuasion, 12

MEDIATION. Q. 1, 6 (1994).
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the hallmark of persuasion,2 and it is on persuasion that we focus here.
In this article, we use the terms “persuade” and “persuasion” 3 to
encompass a range of potential mediator interventions: from indirectly
opening disputants to perspectives other than their own, to actively urging
acceptance of specific proposals that might achieve their objective of ending
a conflict. Although “persuasion”—as a word and an objective—is
uncontroversial in the disciplines whose research forms the basis for this
article, we recognize that the same cannot be said for the world of mediation,
segmented as it is by practice area and philosophy. To be clear, we will not
be discussing—and do not view as appropriate—coercive or manipulative
persuasion practices by which a mediator tries to pressure reluctant parties to
reach particular solutions, merely because he or she wants to “get a
settlement.”
Some mediators call themselves communication facilitators and take the
position that mediators do not engage in persuasion at all. 4 But in our
experience, this claim ignores the reality of most mediation practice. First,
persuasion is an everyday part of human discourse, used not only by
timeshare and used car salesmen, but also by parents, teachers, mental health
therapists and many others we consider in the “helping” professions. 5
Second, persuasion in mediation is a two-way street. Long before a mediator
might try to influence the parties to moderate their demands or consider the
other side’s point of view, chances are good that the parties will have tried to
convince the mediator that they are “right” and the other side is “wrong.” In
the vast majority of disputes in which the assistance of a mediator is needed
or requested, far more than mere “facilitation” is necessary to help the parties
resolve deeply held or competitively bargained differences. Mediators in
different practice settings and with differing ideological perspectives may
well disagree about specific goals and methods of persuasion, but most
mediators engage pervasively in persuasion activities.
If you question this statement, consider first some possible persuasion
goals in mediation. A recent survey of thirty highly experienced mediators
asked them to identify the “essential strengths and techniques” that most
2 Id. at 6.
3 According to one dictionary, “persuade” means: (1) “to prevail on (a person) to do

something, as by advising or urging, etc.; (2) to induce to believe; convince.” THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1076 (1979). Note that these
definitions are consistent with both active forms of persuasion (“urging,” “convincing”)
and more passive, indirect forms (“inducing”). In this article, we consider both.
4 See generally Tidwell, supra note 1.
5 DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: A
VIDEO-INTEGRATED TEXT 228 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter, FRENKEL & STARK].
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contributed to their ability to settle disputes. More than seventy-five percent
rated their ability to develop rapport with the parties— a relationship of
understanding, empathy and trust—as the most important ingredient of their
success. 6 In our experience, most effective mediators engage in various
forms of “rapport-building” persuasion, for example, by describing their
credentials or previous successes as a mediator as a way of gaining the
parties’ confidence, or by listening “actively” to demonstrate understanding
of the participants’ feelings and concerns, thereby establishing a relationship
of trust. Active listening by mediators is inherently desirable because it helps
mediation participants feel heard. But it can also be used (and often is used)
for instrumental purposes by mediators to inculcate trust and rapport so that
their later, more overt persuasion efforts will be more effective.
Virtually all mediators, we would submit, also routinely engage in
conduct we would term “process” persuasion. For example, they may try to
convince reluctant participants to give mediation a good faith try; to agree to
a set of ground rules that will assist in the process; to avoid retreating into
private caucuses prematurely (in order to encourage direct party
communications and hopefully foster empathy); or to share information,
including damaging information and information about their actual
bargaining authority, so that their true needs and priorities and a bargaining
zone (if one exists) can be identified.
Next, mediation is often claimed to “add value” to unassisted
negotiations by helping parties overcome cognitive, psychological, and
strategic barriers to resolution that they cannot readily overcome
themselves.7 We believe that most mediators—at least those who want to be
effective—work hard at what might be called “attitudinal” persuasion, as for
example when they try to persuade disputants to maintain their optimism in
the face of apparent impasse, to avoid making extreme demands that might
create an impasse, not to demonize the other side, presume it is acting out of
bad motives, or react in a fit of pique to the other side’s proposals and reject
them out of hand.8
6 Stephen B. Goldberg, The Secrets of Successful Mediators, 21 NEGOTIATIONS J.
365, 366 (2005).
7 See generally Robert Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”:
Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1996).
8 Transformative mediators engage in attitudinal persuasion too. In what might be
called “recognition” persuasion, they may try to persuade aggressive or self-confident
parties to acknowledge their opponent’s legitimate perspectives and constraints. The
principles of transformative mediation are set out in ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1st ed. 1994).
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Finally, although their approaches may differ, most mediators—both
facilitative and evaluative—also engage in at least some form of
“substantive” or “outcome-oriented” persuasion—for example by helping
them to come to terms with the fact that their initial goals for the mediation
may not be achievable; to consider the reality of how current proposals for
resolution compare with their non-settlement options; or by asking questions,
or making statements, designed to encourage them to think about the
weaknesses of their case, or other ways that a disinterested person might look
at contested events.
The methods mediators use to achieve these and other objectives are
almost limitless in their variety. Mediators persuade by asking questions and
by making statements. They persuade by trying to thaw damaged
relationships and cool down heated emotions. They persuade by trying to
engage the disputants in cooperative brainstorming activities. They persuade
by “conditioning” the parties through flattery and humor or by using “just
between us” type statements in private caucus.9
Mediators persuade by urging disputants to establish priorities or by
obtaining commitments to a set of norms and standards that may guide the
negotiations.10 They persuade by re-framing losses as gains.11 They may try
to influence disputants’ attitudes by presenting difficult messages in a way
designed to make them “go down more easily.” Sometimes, mediators
persuade by instilling optimism and hope; at other times, by sowing doubt or
anxiety. Mediators can regulate the degree of pressure that disputants
experience by giving them frequent breaks to think things over, or
alternatively, by establishing and sticking to short deadlines. Some of these
modes of persuasion are benign and universally accepted; others might well
be considered inappropriately manipulative or coercive. Because mediation is
practiced in widely varying settings, what might be considered appropriate
mediator persuasion in one context might be considered inappropriate in
another. Our only point is that persuasion is endemic to mediation and the list
of persuasion tools available to mediators—from which they may pick and
choose—is very long.
The study of persuasion traces its roots back to Aristotle.12 In the past
9 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 234–35.
10 Tidwell, supra note 1, at 11 (describing how mediators persuade by helping the

disputants make small, incremental commitments, first to the process, then to an agenda,
then substantively, towards an agreement).
11 See, e.g., Daniel O’Keefe & Jakob Jensen, The Relative Persuasiveness of
Gain-Framed Loss-Framed Messages for Encouraging Disease Prevention Behaviors: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 12 J. HEALTH COMM. 623 (2007).
12 See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.
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fifty years or so, social psychologists and communication theorists have
made substantial inroads in demonstrating empirically what kinds of
persuasive interventions work, in contexts ranging from advertising to jury
advocacy to politics. Today, well conducted meta-analyses 13 of many
individual empirical studies help social scientists generalize about empirical
findings with greater statistical confidence. Given the prevalence of
persuasion (as we have defined it) in all forms of mediation, it is surprising
that more attention has not been paid by mediators to the many ways this
body of empirical work might inform their practice. What might account for
this?
One explanation may stem from the fact that, for some in the field, the
word “persuasion” has a pejorative connotation (with images of slick or
heavy-handed neutrals seeking to get a deal at almost any cost) that the more
friendly “problem solving” does not. Writing more than fifteen years ago,
Deborah Kolb and Kenneth Kressel observed that because mediators are
frequently uncomfortable about the persuasive, potentially coercive, powers
they exert, they are prone to engage in a “kind of denial about what they do.
[This] denial stands in the way of learning and keeps the field from better
understanding the uses and limits of pressure.”14 We strongly concur with
this view.
We suspect that most mediators who are comfortable acting in a
persuasive mode have standard or default approaches for doing so. These
may be based on some combination of (a) intuitions about what is effective,
(b) normative views about what is “good” or “ethical” mediation, (c)
personal style and comfort, and (d) a sense of mastery or lack of mastery of
specific persuasive techniques. But if persuasion is an inevitable part of
mediation, it behooves professionals in the field to acquaint themselves with
what social science can teach about more and less effective persuasive
practices, and the psychological and contextual factors that may make them
so. If there are any potential tensions between “ethical” mediation and
effective persuasion, mediators ought at least to be aware of these tensions,
so that they can make better informed choices about how they wish to
practice. Indeed, if research reveals new understandings about how

13 For an analysis of meta-analytic methods, limitations and best practices from a
leading persuasion researcher, see Daniel J. O’Keefe, Extracting Dependable
Generalizations From the Persuasion Effects Literature: Some Issues in Meta-Analytic
Reviews, 58 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 472 (1991).
14 Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in
WHEN TALK WORKS 459, 483 (1994).
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persuasion works, this might even affect what we view as “ethical.”15
The social science literature on persuasion is vast and complex, and we
make no attempt to canvass it all here. Many important topics are omitted.
For example, we do not address the myriad of factors that may affect the
credibility of the messenger or his or her message, as important as these
source factors have been demonstrated to be. These include the likability,
personal attractiveness, and authoritativeness of the person engaging in
persuasion, as well as the success of his or her attempts to establish a sense
of similarity, or personal connection, with the persuasion subject.16 Nor, with
one important exception,17 do we focus on subject or receiver factors that
may affect how persuasive messages are likely to be processed or how easily
a person may be persuaded. For example, we largely exclude from our
discussion the effect on persuasion of variables such as differences in a
receiver’s education and intelligence, 18 self-esteem, 19 egoism versus
15 The closest thing to a “universal” set of ethical standards for mediators are the
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, first promulgated in 1994 and revised in
2004. A joint effort of the American Bar Association’s Section on Dispute Resolution,
the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for Conflict Resolution, the
Model Standards are written at a high level of generality, speaking in conclusory terms
(for which they have been criticized) about the importance of such values as party
self-determination, mediator impartiality and confidentiality of the process. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil is Not in the Details of the
New Model of Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 31 (Spring
2006). While the Model Standards make explicit that certain mediator goals are
inappropriate—overriding party self-determination in pursuit of higher settlement rates,
for example, see Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, Standard IB—they are
wholly silent on the ethical appropriateness or inappropriateness of specific mediator
techniques and interventions.
16 On source factors affecting persuasion, see generally DANIEL O’KEEFE,
PERSUASION: THEORY & RESEARCH 181–213 (2d ed. 2002); ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 167–229 (1993).
17 Because ego-investment and its corollary, position entrenchment, are such
common barriers to resolution in negotiation and mediation, we do consider these in
various sections of this article.
18 There is some research evidence that persons of lower intelligence are generally
easier to persuade than persons of higher intelligence. See, e.g., HERBERT SIMONS,
PERSUASION IN SOCIETY 37–38 (2001) (citing Nancy Rhodes & Wendy Wood,
Self-Esteem and Intelligence Affect Influenceability: The Mediating Role of Message
Reception, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 156 (1992)). On the other hand, it has been difficult to
test the impact of differing education levels on persuadability, because so many of the
research studies use college and university graduates and undergraduates as their
subjects. See Mike Allen, Comparing the Persuasive Effectiveness One- and Two-Sided
Messages, in, PERSUASION: ADVANCES THROUGH META-ANALYSIS 93–94 (Mike Allen &
Raymond W. Preiss eds., 1998). In any event, mediators do not often get to pick and
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concern for others,20 and resistance to yielding,21 all of which have been
subject to experimental study.
The principal emphasis of this article is on selected message and
behavioral variables over which mediators may have most control. By
“message” variables, we refer to variations in how the mediator’s
communications are conveyed—and the impact these variables may have on
persuasion effectiveness. By “behavioral” variables, we are referring to the
influence that a disputant’s own behaviors—actions that are requested or
induced by the mediator—may have on that disputant’s attitudes, beliefs, or
conduct. Put differently, the distinction we are drawing is between direct
attempts at persuasion by the mediator, through various types of persuasive
messages, as opposed to indirect attempts at persuasion by the mediator, by
inducing the disputants to engage in conduct that may lead to
self-persuasion.22
Four disclaimers are in order. First, we are lawyers, not social scientists.
While we have made every effort to master this literature and have consulted
with experts to answer some of our questions, all errors of omission,
interpretation, and presentation are ours.23
Second, the studies we canvas are of persuasive interventions in fields as
choose the personal characteristics of the disputants whose cases they mediate. By
contrast, they do get to choose the modes of persuasion they wish to use, and the order in
which they will attempt them.
19 See generally Rhodes & Wood, supra note 18. See also O’KEEFE, supra note 16,
at 243–44.
20 Carsten De Dreu, Laurie Weingart & Seungwoo Kwon, Influence of Social
Motives on Integrative Negotiation: A Meta-Analytic Review and Test of Two Theories, 78
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 889–905 (2000).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Elliot Aronson, The Power of Self-Persuasion, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
875–84 (1999).
23 In conducting the research for this article, we conducted word and author searches
relevant to each topic, utilizing a wide variety of general and social science electronic
databases, including: PsycINFO; Psychnet, EBSCO Communication and EBSCO Mass
Media Complete; Psychology: A SAGE Full Text Collection; Google Scholar; and
Dissertations and Theses Full Text. Often, social science experiments located in this
fashion led to other studies and sources on that topic. While we cannot vouch for having
read every relevant study, we followed the research where it led us—sometimes, as will
be seen, in unanticipated directions. The individual studies and meta-analyses we
canvassed are predominantly, although not exclusively, from Western and English
language sources. While we acknowledge the importance of knowing how persuasion
efficacy might vary across differing cultures and languages, a comprehensive
comparative study was beyond the scope of this project.
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diverse as advertising, disease prevention, race relations, and politics;
virtually none are of persuasion in mediation. Making reliable generalizations
from any body of empirical work, no matter how broad or sound, is a dicey
proposition.24 While we are obviously interested in speculating how the
studies we canvas may apply to the world of mediation, we also want to
avoid overly broad claims and generalizations.
Third, in making statements throughout this paper such as “[x-type]
interventions have been shown to be more effective in persuasion than
[y-type] interventions,” we obviously do not mean to suggest that any
particular persuasive intervention will or will not work in a specific situation.
Social scientists deal in generalities, not particularities. Moreover, theorists
agree that persuasion is usually an incremental process, in which people’s
minds are changed gradually, by means of multiple interventions over time.25
Fourth, as important as the topic is, detailed exploration of the ethical
limitations of appropriate mediator persuasion is beyond the scope of this
article. For our part and for what it’s worth, we are comfortable with
persuasive interventions that are primarily disputant-centered rather than
mediator-driven: i.e., designed to help the parties—often under significant
time constraints—to evaluate their needs, goals, and options more objectively
and achieve quality resolutions to their problems that might otherwise elude
them, rather than serving mediator goals such as “settlement for settlement’s
sake.” 26 As for choosing proper means to achieve disputant-centered goals,
24 The basic problem is one of external validity, which concerns the extent to which

social science research findings can be generalized beyond the particular study at hand to
different people, different settings, and different times. See generally ROBERT LAWLESS,
JENNIFER ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 39 (2010).
25 SIMONS, supra note 18, at 30. In addition, in some of the message areas we cover,
“effect sizes”—the magnitude of the statistical relationship between the variables under
study—even if statistically significant, may be small. See generally LAWLESS, ET AL.,
supra note 24, at 409.
26 See, e.g., GARY C. WOODWARD & ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., PERSUASION AND
INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 17 (4th ed. 2000) (Persuasion may spring from selfish
motivations or altruistic ones: we may gain money or prestige from our abilities to
influence others or we may act out of genuine regard for the welfare of those we seek to
influence). The difficulty with this formulation, of course, is that people often act for a
complicated mix of both self-interested and other-directed reasons. In our view, ethical
mediators conscientiously attempt to subordinate their own goals and interests at all times
to those of the parties. But this requires a good deal of self-knowledge and reflection, and
is clearly easier said than done. On the difficulty of avoiding unconscious mediator
influence on outcomes in mediation and achieving mediator neutrality, see, e.g., David
Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations on
a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 613 (1989); Alison Taylor,
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we do not think that there are any simple litmus tests to determine when
interventions cross the line from “proper” persuasion into inappropriate
coercion or manipulation. Ultimately, these are difficult questions that
mediators must decide for themselves, based on their mediation philosophy,
the settings in which they practice, and the context of particular disputes in
which they are engaged.
In this article, we present and analyze the existing research on a variety
of persuasive interventions, in roughly the order at least some mediators
might attempt them in a hotly contested mediation like the Halverson matter.
In Parts II and III, we discuss orchestrating role reversals and apologies, two
interventions that utilize an indirect or behavioral approach to persuasion. In
Parts IV–VI, we turn to direct persuasion and to message variables that may
affect the persuasive effect of such interventions, including the choice of
rhetorical questions or statements (Part IV), the relative effectiveness of
one-sided versus two-sided statements and the persuasive effects of message
explicitness (Part V), and the use of “negative” emotions such as fear and
guilt in efforts to persuade (Part VI).
In Parts VII and VIII, we turn to indirect and direct modes of persuasion
that might be used in the later stages of the mediation process, once the
actual bargaining begins. In Part VII, we consider group brainstorming as an
indirect method of persuasion aimed at generating more ideas for resolution
and/or inducing greater cooperation between the disputants. In Part VIII, we
examine the use of a sequence of requests—as opposed to a single,
straightforward one—to try to obtain bargaining concessions.

II. “SAYING IS BELIEVING”: PERSUASION THROUGH
COUNTER-ATTITUDINAL ADVOCACY
One approach to seeking to change a person’s mind is to have them
actively engage and momentarily experience a competing perspective in
some fashion. That engagement by the subject has been labeled
counter-attitudinal advocacy. A classic example of this mode of
persuasion—used by mediators, therapists, and others—is role reversal.
Role reversal is a technique that asks each party to “step into the shoes”
of the other party and consider how a situation or an issue might look from
that person’s perspective. The goal is to have each person acknowledge,

Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Context, Ethics, Influence and
Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215 (1997).
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verbally if possible, that the situation might look differently when viewed
from the other side.27
Interventions using role reversal generally ask parties to: (a) put aside
their own perspective for the moment; (b) try to see the issue as the other side
does (not as they would if they were the other side); and (c) articulate that
other perspective. The theory is that once disputants have experienced saying,
and hearing themselves say, such words, the other side’s perspective may
become more understandable (even if not totally convincing) and opposition
to it may soften. On a deeper level, it is hoped that role reversals can trigger
empathy for the other side, producing some thawing of strained relationships.
There are many variations of this basic concept, all of which involve the
mediator’s helping the party see a different perspective even if they cannot,
or will not, at first. As examples, the mediator can help the parties to:
• Consider how their own statements and actions may have been
understood (or misunderstood) by the other side, as in: “If you were Ms.
Halverson, how would your conduct (proposal) look?” Or, “Put yourself in
Ms. Halverson’s shoes. What do you think she might have thought when she
read her email notice of termination? . . . I know you don’t agree, but try to
say in words what she might have been thinking.”
• Consider how the other party’s past actions might have a different
and more innocent explanation, as in: “Looking at it from Ms. Halverson’s
perspective, why do you think she acted as she did when she learned that she
had been passed over for the promotion? What are some possible reasons?”
• Better appreciate each other’s arguments. A mediator can ask each
party, including their counsel, “If you were the other side, what arguments
would you make in support of your position?” Or specifically here: “If you
were Ms. Halverson’s attorney, how might you use the overtly sexist
comments attributed to Mr. Hernandez to buttress your case?”
Note how role reversal purports to work, as an indirect mode of
persuasion: through a series of questions, in a type of role-playing process,
the mediator attempts to engage each party actively in a process of
self-persuasion. Each party is asked to consider a viewpoint that is different
from his or her own and to improvise arguments in favor of that opposing
point of view. Is role reversal effective in changing minds? Empirical studies
of this type of persuasive intervention—called “counter-attitudinal
advocacy”—date back more than fifty years, and the research evidence
appears strongly to support its efficacy.

A. Counter-Attitudinal Advocacy Studies
27 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 238.
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Two early experiments by a well-known Yale social psychologist and his
research colleague were among the first to investigate empirically whether
getting people to verbalize and advocate opinions that may not correspond
with their inner convictions produces greater attitudinal change than merely
exposing them to the same opinions passively (i.e., by their reading or
hearing the material).28 In both studies, subjects were found more likely to
change their opinions on the topic if induced to give a speech to others
formulating and elaborating their own arguments in support of a position
opposed to their own, as opposed to merely hearing another person’s
arguments (in the first study) or reading or repeating another person’s
arguments (in the second).
These findings have been replicated often in subsequent years. In several
experiments, counter-attitudinal role-playing had a significant positive effect
on opinion change, even on topics at odds with research subjects’ deeply held
beliefs. In one study, for example, students at a conservative Christian
college were more likely to change their opinions on topics such as the sale
of alcohol to raise money for the improvement of public schools if they were
asked to prepare in writing their own best reasons for such an initiative,
rather than being asked simply to reproduce the ideas of others.29 In another
series of studies, Caucasian students were asked to write essays publicly
endorsing a controversial proposal to double the number of academic
scholarships available to African-American students at their college. The
general attitudes of the student subjects became more favorable towards
African-Americans as a result of writing these counter-attitudinal essays.30
Results from persuasion experiments involving other forms of role-playing
are generally similar.31
28 Irving T. Janis & Burt T. King, The Influence of Role-Playing on Opinion Change,

49 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (1954) [hereinafter, “Janis & King”]; Burt T.
King & Irving L. Janis, Comparison of the Effectiveness of Improvised Versus
Non-Improvised Role-Playing in Producing Opinion Changes, 9 HUM. REL. 177 (1956)
[hereinafter, “King & Janis”].
29 O. J. Harvey & George D. Beverly, Some Personality Correlates of Concept
Change Through Role Playing, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1961).
30 Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, Generalization of Dissonance Reduction,
Decreasing Prejudice Through Induced Compliance, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 395 (1994); Michael R. Leippe & Donna Eisenstadt, A Self-Accountability
Model of Dissonance Reduction: Multiple Modes on a Continuum of Elaboration, in
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY: REVIVAL WITH REVISIONS AND CONTROVERSIES (E.
Harmon Jones & J. S. Mills eds., 1998).
31 See, e.g., Irving L. Janis & Leon Mann, Effectiveness of Emotional Role-playing
in Modifying Smoking Habits and Attitudes, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. IN PERSONALITY 84
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What are the psychological mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of
counter-attitudinal advocacy? Janis and King theorized that this effect was
not caused by deeper processing or increased comprehension, but rather by
“a lowering of psychological resistance whenever a person regards the
persuasive ideas emanating from others as his ‘own’ ideas.”32 According to
the authors, the studies provide evidence that opinion change is substantially
augmented by one’s active participation. As they put it, “saying is
believing.”33
Subsequent research has focused on two other factors that also may help
explain the persuasive effectiveness of counter-attitudinal advocacy. One
factor is “biased scanning”: the process of focusing the attention of the
subject on arguments that are different from his or her own views and
thereby increasing the accessibility of those arguments to the subject.”34
This line of research links up with research on biased assimilation of
information. Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that people
generally pursue and assimilate new information in accordance with their
preexisting biases and beliefs.35 In a well-known experiment demonstrating
(1965) (female smokers induced to act in role-plays in which they learn from their doctor
that they have severe lung cancer far more effective in inducing attitude change about
smoking than listening to audiotapes of same session).
32 King & Janis, supra note 28, at 183.
33 Janis & King, supra note 28, at 211. This theory builds on earlier work by H.L.
Hollingsworth, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AUDIENCE (1943), positing that “resentment and
negativistic reactions may interfere with acceptance of a direct suggestion from others,
whereas the individual’s belief that he is making a decision on his own initiative may
increase the influence of an indirect suggestion.” King & Janis, supra note 28, at 183.
The authors also note: “The notion that a direct approach tends to stimulate internal
resistance seems to be a major assumption in theoretical discussions of the rationale for
nondirective psychotherapy.” Id. at 183 (citing CARL ROGERS, COUNSELING &
PSYCHOTHERAPY (1942)). Later studies confirm that active role playing generally
produces greater attitude change than passive exposure to comparable information. See
ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 502 (1993)
(listing studies in support of this generalization).
34 EAGLY & CHAIKEN, supra note 33, at 502–04.
35 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A
Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al.
eds., 1995); MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (5th ed.
2001); MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN
NEGOTIATION (1991); Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict
Resolution and How to Overcome Them, in HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 213
(Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al.,
Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 133 (2010).
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how partisan perspectives affect how we assimilate new information, groups
of proponents and opponents of capital punishment were each presented with
two opposing studies, one supporting its effectiveness as a deterrent to crime,
the other providing evidence showing no deterrent effect at all. After reading
the two studies, each group thought that the study supporting their
preexisting views was logically superior to the study opposing them. Not
only that, but after reading the mixed evidence from a combination of the
two studies, each side felt more committed to its original position than
before.36
However, in a follow-up study, these researchers found that subjects told
to “consider the opposite” were able to overcome their cognitive biases to a
much greater extent than those told merely to “be fair and objective.”37 This
suggests that counter-attitudinal advocacy may persuade by forcing subjects
to personally engage with opposing viewpoints that they are psychologically
predisposed against taking in.
According to another school of thought, counter-attitudinal advocacy
works because of cognitive dissonance. According to cognitive dissonance
theory:
[D]issonance (an unpleasant feeling) is aroused when an individual
says or does something that runs counter to his or her own beliefs,
especially if this action threatens the individual’s self-concept of being a

36 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude

Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
37 Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the Opposite:
A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231,
1239 (1984). The authors gave 120 Stanford undergraduates, who had earlier indicated
support or opposition to capital punishment, two summaries of studies to read, one
supporting and one not supporting the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Respondents
were then divided into three groups, consisting of twenty opponents and twenty
supporters each. As in the first study, the attitudes of respondents in the “replication” (of
the 1979 study) group were more polarized rather than less in their thinking after reading
the conflicting studies. Respondents in the second group were admonished (like a judge
or jury) “to be as objective and unbiased as possible in evaluating the studies you read.”
Id. at 1233. The attitudes of the respondents in this second group were just as polarized as
that of those in the replication group after reading the studies. However, respondents in
the third group—instructed (actively) to consider the opposite—specifically, to “[a]sk
yourself at each step whether you would have made the same high or low evaluations had
exactly the same study produced results on the other side of the issue”—experienced
significantly less belief polarization than either of the other groups. Id. at 1233.
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decent or rational person. To reduce dissonance, people will try to bring
those disparate cognitions into greater harmony.38

Applied specifically to counter-attitudinal advocacy, tools like role
reversal seem to work as a mode of persuasion because subjects ask
themselves: “how can I come up with such plausible reasons if I don’t
believe they have merit?”39
Persuasion researchers working generally in the field of cognitive
dissonance have also spent a good deal of time investigating how external
incentives affect attitude change. In a famous early experiment, Festenger
and Carlsmith demonstrated that smaller incentives produce greater
self-persuasion than larger ones. 40 Students paid $1 to falsely tell other
students that a boring task was fun later rated the task as more fun than those
students paid $20 to tell the same lie. According to one commentator, “the
lower incentive facilitated more self-persuasion, presumably because these
subjects had less external motivation to lie. As a result, they provided [their
own] internal motivation or justification for their behavior.”41
Another fascinating pair of studies involved preschool children. In the
first study, the children were divided into two groups and told not to play
with an attractive toy. One group was given a severe threat for doing so; the
other group a mild threat. When the threat condition was later lifted, children
given the severe threat went right back to playing with the toy; children given
the mild threat did so far less. Why? Because children given a severe threat
knew why they were not playing with the toy: they would be severely
punished by an adult if they did. Children given the mild threat had to
“supply some additional justification on their own . . . [they] subsequently
convinced themselves that the forbidden toy was less attractive . . . .”42 The
moral, according to one long-time researcher in the field: “Self-persuasion
has staying power.”43
38 Aronson, supra note 22, at 876. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1959).
39 Anthony G. Greenwald & Rosita Daskal Albert, Acceptance and Recall of
Improvised Arguments, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1968).
40 Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959).
41 E. Scott Geller, The Art of Self-Persuasion, SAFETYPERFORMANCE.COM 5 (2001),
http://www.safetyperformance.com/pdf/Articles/2001/TheArtofSelf-Persuasion.pdf.
42 Elliot Aronson & J. Merrill Carlsmith, Effect of the Severity of Threat on the
Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 584 (1963).
43 Aronson, supra note 22, at 877. These toy studies have been replicated on a
number of occasions. In one follow-up study, the second experiment was
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A general caution is in order, however. Many studies of
counter-attitudinal advocacy tend to test subjects’ persuadability on topics of
relatively low interest or ego involvement to them.44 A 1976 study45 sheds
some light on how counter-attitudinal advocacy may work differently with
subjects who—like many parties in mediation—have strong feelings and
opinions about a topic. In this study, researchers examined U.S.C.
undergraduate students’ attitudes about “required on-campus housing for all
students.” 46 Pre-testing sorted out students with strong negative feelings
about this topic from those without strong views. Subjects were then asked to
write essays advocating compulsory on-campus housing and were told that
their essays would be used in subsequent efforts to convince others to adopt
this policy. The study mostly found what the researchers predicted:
Low-involvement subjects showed a significant change in their “most
acceptable” positions as a result of writing these essays. Highly involved
subjects reported no significant changes in their “most acceptable” positions:
they maintained extreme, negative positions toward compulsory on-campus
residence. Changes in viewpoints, if any, were only “at the margins.”

B. Mediation Applications and Questions
Role reversal, “consider the opposite,” and other forms of
counter-attitudinal advocacy are persuasion tools that ought to be acceptable
to most mediators, no matter what their role orientation or philosophy. They
are tools by which the mediator attempts to lower tensions by inducing in
each party greater appreciation of the other side’s arguments and concerns.47
conducted—with similar effects—forty days after the first. Jonathan L. Freedman,
Long-term Behavioral Effects of Cognitive Dissonance, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 145 (1965). In another replication, boys who were given severe or mild threats
not to play with an attractive toy were later asked to falsify their scores on a separate test
another researcher administered to them. Mark R. Lepper, Dissonance, Self-Perception,
and Honesty in Children, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 65 (1973). “Those boys
who had earlier received the mild threat were significantly less likely to cheat than those
who received the severe threat. Apparently, the boys who earlier complied with only a
mild threat were more likely to develop the self-perception that ‘I’m a good boy who
resists temptation . . . ’” Geller, supra note 41, at 7.
44 Greenwald & Albert, supra note 39, at 31, 33.
45 Edward M. Bodaken & Kenneth K. Sereno, Counterattitudinal Advocacy,
Ego-Involvement, and Persuasive Effect, 39 W. SPEECH COMM. 236 (1976)
(undergraduate students arbitrarily assigned to improvise arguments in favor of either
general or specialized undergraduate education).
46 Id. at 240.
47 While they might not be equally comfortable or adept at trying to orchestrate a

279

THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 28:2 2013]

They appear to help overcome partisan assimilation of information—a
pervasive cognitive bias. Lowering tensions and overcoming biases are
considered important components of what effective mediators do, according
to conventional theory. Moreover, these devices would appear to be widely
applicable to all kinds of cases, including pure money disputes.
Even more important, some of this research suggests that self-persuasion
devices like role reversal produce lasting changes in attitudes. This is a
potentially highly significant finding for mediators. Disputants whose
attitudes have really been changed are more likely to “own” their
agreements, and are more likely to comply with them as well.48 As we will
discuss, many other modes of persuasion can also be effective, but if they
produce more ephemeral attitude changes, this can lead to post-negotiation
regret and even repudiation of agreements.
Nonetheless, these persuasion techniques are obviously not a panacea.
First, some research findings suggest what mediation experience
demonstrates: when disputants are deeply entrenched (highly
“ego-involved”) in a position—for example, furious at their opponent for
having acted disrespectfully or in bad faith, or supremely confident that their
case is a “slam dunk” —inducing them to consider opposing viewpoints may
produce slow, incremental change at best. Noted Harvard educational
psychologist Howard Gardner observes that most “self-persuasion” is like
this. It occurs gradually, as a result of small shifts in perceptions and
viewpoints, rather than as the result of any single argument or sudden
realization.49 To the extent that this is true, it may be the case that counter
attitudinal advocacy interventions should be attempted early in the mediation
process, well before the actual bargaining begins, perhaps buttressed by
other, more direct persuasive devices.50
role reversal, mediators of all philosophies view the development of greater mutual
empathy as both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. Compare FRENKEL & STARK,
supra note 5, at 183–84, 238–39, and BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 8, at 99–101
(emphasizing importance of perspective-taking in “help[ing] make each party more
intelligible to each other”), with GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING
CONFLICT: MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008) (setting out a
caucus-eschewing, “understanding-based” model of mediation that stresses the parties’
ability “to take each other’s views into account.”).
48 See Craig A. McEwan & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11 (1984).
49 HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS 173 (2004).
50 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 236–39 (proposing a “progressive” model of
mediation persuasion, and recommending role reversal at an early stage of the persuasion
process).
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Second, research experiments suggest that, although role reversal
interventions may improve understanding of the other side’s perspective,
they do not necessarily lead to resolution when the parties’ positions are
directly incompatible.51 Some of the early literature on role playing comes
from the field of therapy, in which the relationship between therapist and
patient is fundamentally a cooperative one. By contrast, when directly
opposing positions between two adversarial negotiators are clarified and
better understood, competition may escalate rather than abate. It may
therefore be the case that role reversal enhances cooperation in mediation
only where the parties at some level wish to cooperate in the first place.52
Finally, none of the studies of counter-attitudinal advocacy we have read
address the impact of role reversal on feelings, as contrasted with attitudes
and beliefs (to the extent these can be separated). It is a common assumption
among many mediators that role reversal works, in part, because of its
capacity to induce empathy: the capacity to comprehend the other person’s
thoughts, experience and emotions.53 This might be a productive area for
further research.

III. PERSUASION BY ORCHESTRATING APOLOGIES
Suppose that none of your efforts at role reversal have produced
perceptible changes in the parties’ conversation patterns or bargaining
behaviors. In order to produce movement, might it be effective to try to
induce some kind of apology, for example to see if the plaintiff’s immediate
supervisor, Jason Hernandez, would be willing to acknowledge and express
regret to Ms. Halverson for the abrupt and impersonal way that he laid her
off? Or for insensitive sexual comments on the job—albeit not directed at
Ms. Halverson and (presumably, he and his counsel will contend) unrelated
to the decision to lay her off? What are the components of an effective
apology? Under what circumstances might such an intervention be
productive or unproductive? Is there optimal timing for an apology?
The theoretical treatment of apology and forgiveness, from fields such as
philosophy, religion, and psychotherapy, is voluminous. Here, as in the rest
of this article, we focus only on empirical social science findings. To a
greater extent than other topics in this article, this empirical literature has

51 David W. Johnson, Use of Role Reversal in Intergroup Competition, 7 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 135, 140 (1967).
52 Id. at 140.
53 Indeed, in our own writings, we have referred to role reversal as “persuasion
based on empathy.” FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 238.
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been surveyed and summarized by other dispute resolution scholars, 54
although the topic has not been previously characterized as a mode of
“persuasion” available to mediators. We include our own synthesis here
because we view the successful orchestration of an apology as an important
mode of indirect persuasion by means of induced behavior, whose empirical
study should inform the field.
The impact of apologies on injured persons and third party observers has
been a subject of sustained social science research for more than thirty years.
A recent meta-analytic review of 175 studies involving 26,000 participants
concludes that apologies are, in general, positively correlated with
interpersonal forgiveness. 55 As one article puts it, “[a]pologies are the
world’s most . . . pervasive conflict resolution technique . . . serving a crucial
social lubrication role.”56
Studies involving apology have been conducted in the context of
interpersonal disputes;57 public confessions of wrongdoing by political and
public figures; 58 disputes involving business, consumer or employment
relationships;59 with children;60 and with mock criminal and civil juries,
assessing the impact of public apologies and other expressions of remorse by
54 See sources cited infra note 62.
55 Ryan Fehr, Michele J. Gelfand & Monisha Nag, The Road to Forgiveness: A

Meta-Analytic Synthesis of Its Situational and Dispositional Correlates, 136 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 894, 904 (2010) (reporting medium effects sizes).
56 Cynthia McPherson Frantz & Courtney Bennigson, Better Late Than Early: The
Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201
(2005).
57 See, e.g., Michael E. McCullough et al., Interpersonal Forgiving in Close
Relationships: II. Theoretical Elaboration and Measurement, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1586 (1998); Shlomo Hareli & Zvi Eiskovits, The Role of Communicating
Social Emotions Accompanying Apologies in Forgiveness, 30 MOTIVATION EMOTION 189
(2006).
58 See Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY
281 (1991).
59 See, e.g., Edward Tomlinson et al., The Road to Reconciliation: Antecedents of
Victim Willingness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165 (2004)
(breach of contract involving small business owners); Cathy Goodwin & Ivan Ross,
Consumer Responses to Service Failures: Influence of Procedural and Interactional
Fairness Perceptions, 1992 J. BUS. RES. 149 (consumer evaluation of complaint handling
practices).
60 See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to
Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun
Sato, Children’s Reactions to Mitigating Accounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality
of Harm, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (2001).
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offenders on sentencing and compensation decisions. 61 Most recently,
empirical legal scholars interested in negotiation and mediation have begun
to examine how apologies affect the initiation and settlement of legal
claims.62
Experiments involving apologies have taken a number of different forms.
Quite common are what have been termed “scenario” studies.63 In these
experiments, research subjects are asked to react to a written scenario in
which they are told that they have been the victim of a hypothetical offense
(for example, the loss of class notes by a classmate who borrowed them, or
being hit by a car by a negligent driver while riding a bicycle), after which
the “transgressor” did or did not apologize. Researchers then manipulate
different types of offenses and injuries, as well as different types of apologies
and apology components, to measure which are most effective in changing
the injured person’s (hypothetical) feeling states, perceptions of the
transgressor, and inclination to forgive or punish. Such studies have the
advantage of easy experimental control, but obviously lack a degree of
realism.64 Occasionally, apologies are videotaped and shown to subjects,
rather than being quoted (or characterized) on the printed page.65 This may
increase their verisimilitude, by inducing emotional reactions on the part of
research participants as well as cognitive ones.66
61 See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock
Juror Decisions in a Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2002); Dawn T.
Robinson et al., Heinous Crime or Unfortunate Accident? The Effects of Remorse on
Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions, 73 SOC. FORCES 175 (1994) (vehicular
manslaughter case); Chris L. Kleinke et al., Evaluation of a Rapist as a Function of
Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (2001).
62 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994); Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 460 (2003) [hereinafter, Robbennolt I]; Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and
Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333 (2006) [hereinafter Robbennolt II];
Jennifer Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 349 (2008) [hereinafter Robbennolt III]; Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan
Members’ Views About Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
409 (2004) (in medical malpractice study, full disclosure of medical error and apology by
professionals made respondents less likely to seek legal advice; results statistically
significant only where medical error produced minor, not life-threatening, injury).
63 Fehr et al., supra note 55, at 903.
64 Id.
65 See Kleinke, supra note 61, at 527.
66 Fehr et al., supra note 55, at 906 (reporting that scenario studies produce more
cognitions than recall methodologies, which stimulate more feelings).
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Alternatively, research subjects can be asked to react to differing
apologies for offenses they have actually suffered—either past harms they
are asked to recall from their own everyday experience (“recall” studies),67
or transgressions engineered by researchers through the use of experiment
confederates (“induced transgression” studies). In one recall study, for
example, participants were asked a series of questions about “a recent
conflict (within the last six months) you have had with another
individual . . . in which you felt you were wronged, and also in which the
other gave you an apology of some kind.”68 Such studies have the advantage
over scenario studies of greater realism, but may present problems of
memory loss and distortion, as well as difficulty in controlling for widely
differing types and degrees of offenses or harms suffered.
Perhaps more realistic are induced transgression studies. In one
representative experiment, undergraduate marketing students were asked to
prepare an advertising campaign for a new shampoo. Their work was then
negatively evaluated by a person posing as a reviewer but who was actually
an accomplice of the researcher. Following this, the researchers were able to
measure the effectiveness of a number of different remedial interventions,
including apology by the evaluator, in reducing the subjects’ (presumably
real) anger about their negative performance evaluations and their feelings
that it was unfair.69
Least common of all, but perhaps most useful, are field studies, in which
apologies are examined qualitatively, in actual, ongoing conflicts. In our
literature review, we located only one such study, involving victim-offender
mediation.70 In addition, almost all empirical studies to date focus on how
apologies affect victim-recipients or third party observers; with only two
67 Id. at 903.
68 Frantz & Benigson, supra note 56, at 203 (study 1).
69 Robert A. Baron, Countering the Effects of Destructive Criticism: The Relative

Efficacy of Four Interventions, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 235 (1990). In a similar vein,
albeit in a more artificial context, the effects of apologies following one or more
uncooperative acts have been studied in prisoner’s dilemma and ultimatum
(“take-it-or-leave-it”) games. See, e.g., William Bottom et al., When Talk Is Not Cheap:
Substantive Penance and Expressions of Intent in Rebuilding Cooperation, 13 ORG. SCI.
497 (2002) (prisoner dilemma game); Daniel P. Skarlicki, Robert Folger & Julie Gee,
When Social Accounts Backfire: The Exacerbating Effects of a Polite Message or an
Apology On Reactions to an Unfair Outcome, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (2004)
(ultimatum game).
70 Jung Jin Choi & Margaret Severson, “What! What Kind of Apology is This?”: The
Nature of Apology in Victim Offender Mediation, 31 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 813
(2009).
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exceptions,71 we found no experiments attempting to measure the possible
effects of apologizing on the maker of the apology.

A. Effects of Apologies on Apology Recipients’ Perceptions, Feelings
and Behaviors
In general, it has been demonstrated that apologies tend to induce
forgiveness in victims and observer third parties in two principal ways: by
altering apology recipients’ perceptions about the transgressor, or (as
discussed below, the studies here are less robust) by altering apology
recipients’ feeling states, or affect. Importantly, it has been shown that these
cognitive and affective changes can inhibit aggression—the desire to punish
the transgressor or retaliate for his past acts—at a behavioral level.72
In his classic work, Relations in Public, sociologist Erving Goffman
theorized that through the act of apologizing, a transgressor “splits himself
into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that
disassociates itself from [the transgression],” thereby “affirm[ing his] belief
in the offended rule.”73 By signaling his recognition that he has broken a
norm, and by stating that he regrets his actions, the theory goes, a
transgressor enables victims and third persons to distinguish his acts from his
moral character, and to conclude that such acts will likely not be repeated in
the future. 74 Seeing the transgressor in this better light can reduce the
apology recipient’s desire for vindication, punishment or revenge.75
Experimental studies generally confirm that those who apologize tend to
generate more positive perceptions of themselves over a range of dimensions,
71 Charlotte Witvliet, Thomas Ludwig & David Bauer, Please Forgive Me:

Transgressors’ Emotions and Physiology During Imagery of Seeking Forgiveness and
Victim Responses, 21 J. PSYCHOL. & CHRISTIANITY 219 (2002); Tyler Okimoto, Kyle
Hedrick & Michael Wenzel, I Make No Apology: The Psychological Benefits of Refusing
to Apologize, IACM 23RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE PAPER (March 22, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612866.
72 Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi, Masuyo Kameda & Nariyuki Agarie, Apology as Aggression
Control: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 226 (1989).
73 ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113 (1971).
74 Weiner et al., supra note 58, at 284–85.
75 As one article puts it, apologies are effective in resolving interpersonal conflicts
because they convey the idea that the transgressor feels guilty and has already suffered,
thereby lessening the need for any further “sentence.” Seiji Takaku, The Effects of
Apology and Perspective-Taking on Interpersonal Forgiveness, 14 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 494,
494–95 (2001).
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including likeability, blameworthiness, and punishability, 76 and that
apologies often induce forgiveness by the victim or third party.77 These
effects are not uniform, however, but appear to depend on the seriousness of
the actor’s transgressions, the resulting harm, or both.78 For example, in
mock criminal jury studies, a confession coupled with a statement of remorse
by the defendant is more likely to improve moral judgments about the
defendant and influence juror sentencing decisions in a case of accidental
vehicular manslaughter 79 than a case of rape 80 or murder. 81 Similarly,
apologies are more effective in cases involving a single transgression than a
series of transgressions over time. 82 They seem especially effective in
influencing moral judgments about the wrongdoer and in inducing
forgiveness in situations involving “attributional uncertainty”83—where the
reasons for the transgressor’s wrongdoing are unclear and susceptible to
differing interpretations.
Because of the inherent limitations of hypothetical scenario studies, the
empirical evidence they provide about the impact of apologies on recipients’
feeling states about (as contrasted to perceptions of) the transgressor seems
relatively weak; such experiments are unlikely to trigger strong, authentic
76 See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I? A

Study of Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients,
13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10, 11 (1994).
77 Weiner et al., supra note 58, at 308.
78 See, e.g., Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies:
The Effects of Offender Responsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCH. 457
(2001). But see, Robbennolt I, supra note 62, at 492–95 (finding that neither the severity
of the victim’s injury nor strong evidence of transgressor responsibility affected
effectiveness of apologies in ultimate settlement decisions).
79 Robinson et al., supra note 61 (displays of remorse by defendant strongly
influence mock juror perceptions of past future behavior by defendant and resulting
sentences); Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on
Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 64 (1976) (drunk driving case, same
results).
80 Kleinke et al., supra note 61 (finding that expressions of remorse did not affect
proposed jury sentences); R.L.Wiener & N. Rinehart, Psychological Causality in the
Attribution of Responsibility for Rape, 14 SEX ROLES 369, 378 (1986) (statements of
remorse affect moral judgments but not sentencing).
81 Catherine A. Crosby, et al., The Juvenile Death Penalty and the Eighth
Amendment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 245, 259 (1995) (statements of remorse did not
influence sentencing judgments).
82 Bottom et al., supra note 69 (apologies more effective in restoring cooperation in
prisoner dilemma games following short, rather than long, period of competition.)
83 Weiner et al., supra note 58, at 308.
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feelings. On the other hand, several induced transgression studies provide
substantial support for the proposition that apologies reduce anger and induce
forgiveness. Illustrative is an experiment in which Japanese undergraduate
students, given a test of their intellectual abilities that they had been told was
“easy,” then “failed” the test because of (deliberate) mistakes made by an
assistant in administering it. A public apology by the assistant to students, in
the presence of the lead researcher, not only reduced their anger, but also
decreased their desire to punish the assistant through a negative performance
evaluation.84

B. Types of Apologies and Their Effects
Of course, not all apologies are created equal.85 Researchers studying the
components of effective apologies have found (unsurprisingly) that: (1) more
elaborate (“full”) apologies are generally more effective than less elaborate
ones;86 (2) the more serious the transgression or the greater the harm, the
more elaborate the apology that may be expected by the victim or third party
observer 87 (3) partial apologies can be unproductive or even
counterproductive in their effects on the recipient;88 but (4) at least in some
cases-- involving less serious injuries, less clear culpability, or both-- any
apology, even if incomplete, may be better than none.89
The elements of a “full” or “complete” apology have been defined
differently in different studies. One article suggests that full apologies ideally
should include a statement of remorse by the wrongdoer (“I’m really sorry
84 Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie, supra note 72, at 220 (study 1). For similar results in

an employment context, see Baron, supra note 69 (study 1).
85 Frantz & Bennigson, supra note 56, at 201.
86 Steven Scher & John Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to
Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC
RES. 127, 137 (1997); Darby & Schlenker, supra note 60 (children).
87 Bruce Darby & Barry Schlenker, The Use of Apologies in Social Predicaments, 4
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 271, 275 (1981).
88 See, e.g., Robbennolt I, supra note 62, at 483–91 (study 1) (partial apology,
defined as an expression of sympathy without more, had no impact on perceptions of
defendant motorist in bicycle accident case, but made plaintiff-recipients less likely to
accept defendants’ settlement offers). See also Goodwin & Ross, supra note 59 (scenario
study, in which apologies without at least some small token of restitution were not
effective in restoring consumer trust and satisfaction); Skarlacki et al., supra note 69
(apologies increase participants’ sense of unfairness and decrease their willingness to
accept low offers in ultimatum games).
89 Scher & Darley, supra note 86, at 137.
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for what I did”), a statement accepting responsibility or admitting fault for
the transgression (“I know that it was wrong”), a promise of forbearance (“I
promise something like this will never happen again”), and an offer of
recompense or reparation (“I want to set this right. If there is any way I can
make it up to you, please let me know”). 90 Another article adds a fifth
element: explicitly acknowledging the victim’s loss (“I know your bike,
which I lost, means a lot to you”).91 Each added component appears to
contribute to the overall effectiveness of the apology.92 When important
components of an apology are missing, the recipient may tend to blame the
transgressor more and want to sanction him or her more harshly than if a full
apology were offered.93
It has often been hypothesized that the perceived sincerity of an apology
influences its effectiveness.94 This is a difficult variable to measure in many
scenario studies because most experiments are designed in such a way that
apologies are presented in written form 95 or only characterized. 96 One
90 Id. at 132. See also Bornstein et al., supra note 60, at 394–95; Darby & Schlenker,

supra note 87 at 274. Hareli & Eisikovits, supra note 57 (similar effect, but also stresses
the importance of demonstrated shame and guilt in reducing anger and inducing
forgiveness).
91 Manfred Schmitt et al., Effects of Objective and Subjective Account Components
on Forgiving, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 465, 469 (2004).
92 Scher & Darley, supra note 86, at 137.
93 Id. at 137–38. On the other hand, one experiment found that the total gestalt of the
apology may matter more to the victim than its objective elements, and that some
apology elements may matter more than others. For example, acknowledging the victim’s
loss and offering recompense were the two most significant elements to victims, at least
in cases where compensation could remedy the particular transgression (borrowing a
friend’s bicycle and then negligently allowing it to get stolen). In these circumstances,
statements of remorse without an offer of compensation were counter-productive,
because they were deemed insincere. Schmitt et al., supra note 91, at 478, 481–82.
Offering compensation, the authors suggest, implies an admission of fault,
acknowledgment of loss, remorse, or both; the victim receiving an offer of compensation
will often fill these elements in, even if they are not stated.
94 See, e.g., Robinson et al., supra note 61, at 187 (citing Ronald Everett & Barbara
Nienstedt, Rationality and Remorse in Sentence Reduction: Competing Influences or is
Saying You’re Sorry Enough? (1992) (unpublished conference presentation) (reporting
that probation officers react negatively to admissions of responsibility they perceive as
insincere)).
95 See, e.g., Bornstein et al., supra note 61, at 398 (medical malpractice scenario
study. In the physician “remorse” condition, participants read a description in which they
were told that the defendant doctor “expressed remorse for the unfortunate death of
Xavier. He said he was very sorry that Xavier had died, while neither admitting or
denying that the death was his fault.”).
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experiment, however, went a step further, providing subjects with written
“transcripts” of videotaped confessions of a defendant in a vehicular
manslaughter case that either included or omitted a written indication of
remorse on the part of the offender (e.g., “Blood was splashed all over the
windshield (rests arms on chair)” versus “Blood was splashed all over the
windshield (starts crying)”) Not surprisingly, displays of remorse
accompanying a confession positively influenced mock juror perceptions of
the defendant and lowered the sentences they administered.97
Delivering an effective, remorse-conveying apology in the context of a
real, face-to-face exchange, however, is a more complex matter. In a
qualitative case study of actual apologies made by eight juvenile offenders in
a victim-offender mediation (VOM) program over the course of a year,
researchers found substantial discrepancies between the offenders’ views of
the sincerity of their own statements and how those statements were
perceived by victims, mediators, and others privy to the proceedings.98 The
juveniles were required to write and then read letters of apology to the
victims of their offenses. Although they were mandated by the court to
participate in this program as a condition of having their cases diverted from
prosecution, most were sincere about their apologies and put substantial
effort into perfecting their written statements. Nonetheless, others’
perceptions of their sincerity turned on such variables as the speed with
which they read their statements, whether they established eye contact with
their victim, and other aspects of their nonverbal behavior. The study
concluded that “[t]hese VOM sessions make clear that composing and
delivering an apology is a complex undertaking that requires attention to
many factors, including recognition of the influences of the context in which
the apology is delivered, as well as the actual form and presentation of the
apology.”99

C. Studies of Apologies in Legal Disputing and Negotiation
96 See, e.g., Bennett & Earwaker, supra note 78, at 459 (scenario study varying

responsibility of wrongdoer and severity of harm. In all conditions, participants informed
only that “the offender offered a sincere apology and expressed remorse”); Tomlinson et
al., supra note 59, at 176, 181 (scenario study of small business breach of contract
dispute; perceived sincerity of apology characterized, with instructions given to subjects
in the sincere apology condition that “it appeared that this apology was sincere.” Study
finds strong correlation between sincerity of apology and willingness to resume business
relationship.).
97 See generally Robinson et al., supra note 61.
98 Choi & Severson, supra note 70, at 813.
99 Id. at 819.
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Despite much theoretical interest in apologies and their potential effects
in legal dispute settlement, until recently there was very little empirical work
on this specific topic. Researchers have begun to remedy this deficit. In a
1995 study, 445 Stanford undergraduate students were asked to play the role
of a tenant in a hypothetical landlord-tenant dispute. In the scenario, the
tenant sued the landlord to recover a portion of $4,000 in rent paid for a
period of time in which the heater was broken and the apartment had no heat.
Tenants were told by a student legal services lawyer that there was “a good
chance of recovering a portion of the rent,” but no more. In the apology
condition, they were told that at a meeting with the landlord prior to the small
claims court trial, “the landlord apologized to you for his behavior. ‘I know
this is not an acceptable excuse . . . but I have been under a good deal of
pressure lately.’” Asked whether they would accept $900 to settle their
claim, subjects were more likely to do so if the landlord offered this
(characterized) apology than if he did not.100
More recently, in a series of three studies using a simulated personal
injury case, Jennifer Robbennolt has examined the effects of apologies on
settlement decisions in greater detail.101 In each study, participants were
asked to visit a website and to read a scenario describing an incident in which
a bicyclist was injured by an allegedly negligent motorist. Respondents were
then asked to take on the role of the injured person (in the third study,
attorneys were asked to take on the role of the injured person’s attorney) and
to evaluate how likely they would be to accept a particular settlement offer
from the other side.102 In the partial apology condition, participants were
told that the motorist stated, shortly after the accident but prior to the filing of
a lawsuit, “I am so sorry that you were hurt. I really hope that you feel better
soon.” In the full apology condition, the motorist said, “I am so sorry you
were hurt. The accident was all my fault. I was going too fast and not
watching where I was going until too late.” 103 Professor Robbennolt
examined the effects of these statements on the settlement attitudes and
100 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 62, at 147–50. Although the results approached

statistical significance, they did not reach it. However, the authors state their belief that
their result “understates the efficacy of apology for at least two reasons. First, the apology
in the scenario, as written, was not particularly forceful . . . . Second, it is likely that the
force of an apology resonates more when it is expressed face-to-face than it is simply
written down on a piece of paper. Given these limitations, it is surprising that our results
are as strong as they are.” Id. at 149.
101 See generally Robbennolt I, Robbennolt II, Robbennolt III, supra note 62.
102 Robbennolt I, supra note 62, at 483.
103 Id. at 484, n.112.
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decisions of “litigants” and “lawyers” under various conditions, including
more and less clear evidence of negligence, more and less severe injuries,
and differing evidentiary rules governing the admission or exclusion of these
types of statements.
Synthesizing the main findings from these studies, 104 they can be
summarized as follows: first, compared to defendants who made a partial
apology or no apology, defendants who made a full, responsibility-accepting
apology were far more likely to find the plaintiffs willing to accept their
settlement offers.105 Consistent with earlier studies in non-legal contexts, full
apologies not only positively influenced plaintiffs’ perceptions of defendants
(they were seen as more sympathetic and more moral, and were more likely
to be forgiven), 106 but also made plaintiffs more willing to settle. By
contrast, partial apologies had little influence on plaintiffs’ perceptions of the
defendant or their amenability to defendants’ settlement offers, except in
cases of more serious injuries, clearer legal responsibility, or both—where
they were shown to be counterproductive.107
Second, even where receiving a full apology caused plaintiffs to estimate
their chances of success at trial more highly, they lowered their settlement
targets and negotiating reservation (“bottom line”) prices, and viewed
defendants’ settlement offers as more fair.108 This result is consistent with
equity theory, which posits that perceptions of equity and fairness, not just
objective fairness, play an important role in settlement. Quoting Russell
Korobkin, “[a] settlement proposal that might be acceptable to a litigant who
feels personally validated and fairly treated by her opponent, despite the legal
dispute, may be unacceptable to a litigant who feels ignored, unheard, or
invalidated by her opponent.”109 The flip side appears to be true as well:
litigants may be willing to accept less than objective “settlement value” if
they receive a full apology.
Third (and most provocatively), Professor Robbennolt found that full
settlement apologies push plaintiffs’ lawyers in a generally opposite direction
104 Because of limitations of space, these findings are presented in a necessarily
simplified form. Readers interested in the topic of apology would do well to read all three
studies in their entirety, and in addition, Margereth Etienne & Jennifer Robbennolt,
Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295 (2007), containing a useful
summary of the research.
105 Robbennolt I, supra note 62, at 485–86, 506.
106 Id. at 486–90.
107 Id. at 494–99.
108 Robbennolt II, supra note 62, at 362–66.
109 Id. at 348 (quoting Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 17 (2002)).
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from their clients. Despite the fact that they viewed offenders making full
apologies more sympathetically than those making partial (or no) apologies,
“[a]ttorneys whose client received a full apology set somewhat higher
aspirations and made somewhat higher estimates of a fair settlement value
than attorneys whose client received no apology.” 110 Attorneys, in other
words, seem less influenced by equity concerns than their clients and less
inclined to value apologies when made. 111 Professor Robbennolt
hypothesizes that this may be because attorneys are trained to be more
objective, less emotionally entangled, and more focused on legal rights and
.
probable legal outcomes than their clients, among other reasons. 112

D. Timing of Apologies and Other Matters
Several additional apology findings seem potentially relevant to the work
of mediators. First, Cynthia McPherson Frantz and Courtney Bennigson have
examined the question of whether the timing of apologies influences their
effectiveness.113 They hypothesized that, in general, later apologies would be
more effective than earlier ones, because of ripeness issues influencing a
victim’s readiness to de-escalate a conflict. They further theorized that
victims would in general want an opportunity fully to vent their feelings and
express their point of view (be given “voice”) before being open to receiving
(much less accepting) an apology and forgiving their transgressor. These
hypotheses were supported in both recall and scenario experiments they
conducted.
110 Robbennolt III, supra note 62, at 379–80.
111 Id. at 365–66.
112 Id. at 365–69. A recent empirical study may provide additional indirect support
for Robbennolt’s findings regarding lawyers. Jean Poitras and his colleagues conducted a
comparative analysis of workplace mediations with and without lawyers in Quebec
Province, Canada. Contrary to expectations, they found that the presence of lawyers had
no negative impact on settlement rates, mediation duration, or party satisfaction with the
process or the outcome. However, they found that the presence of lawyers led to a
statistically significant (30%) reduction in the level of self-reported sense of
reconciliation between the parties. They attributed this reduced level of reconciliation to
(1) attorneys’ tendency to focus on the legal, rather than the relationship-building, aspects
of their cases; (2) their tendency to speak on behalf of their clients, rather than allowing
them to speak for themselves; and (3) their reluctance to allow their clients to apologize.
See Jean Poitras, Arnaud Stimec & Jean-Francois Roberge, The Negative Impact of
Attorneys on Mediation Outcomes: A Myth or a Reality, 2010 NEGOTIATION J. 9 (2010).
113 Frantz & Bennigson, supra note 56.
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Although it takes an offender to initiate an apology, it has been
suggested that a victim must accept the apology for the exchange to be
completed successfully and constructively.114 Researchers have begun to
examine the conditions under which victims are most likely to accept an
apology when offered. In two related studies, 115 Seiji Takaku and his
colleagues examined the efficacy of three perspective-taking strategies on
victims’ willingness to forgive their transgressors. 116 They found that
victims of a hypothetical interpersonal wrong (a classmate’s three-hour delay
in returning class notes before an important final exam) were significantly
more likely to accept a (generous) apology from a transgressor if they were
first asked to imagine themselves as a wrongdoer. Given an instruction that
read, in part, “Please take a moment and visualize an event in which you
broke a promise with, forgot to do something for, or
intentionally/unintentionally hurt others in the past. Please try to remember
how you thought, felt and behaved in that situation,” victims had more
positive perceptions of and feelings about the wrongdoer, and expressed a
greater intent to forgive than in any of the other conditions.
On the other hand, some research suggests that, because of social norms
(e.g., people may be viewed as churlish if they refuse to accept an offer of
amends), victims will accept apologies (or at least not reject them publically)
even when they think them inadequate or insincere. In one scenario study,
even when subjects wanted to reject apologies they viewed as unconvincing,
they indicated little intention to do so.117 And in the victim-offender field
study previously discussed, actual victims reported feeling considerable
pressure to accept apologies even when they perceived them to be
insincere.118 From this perspective, apology exchanges may be somewhat
effective in reducing interpersonal tensions even when they are ritualized and
not entirely authentic.

E. Effects of Apologies on the Apologizer
114 Takaku, supra note 75, at 495.
115 Id. See also Seiji Takaku, Bernard Weiner & Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi, A

Cross-Cultural Examination of the Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on
Forgiveness, 20 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 144, 149-50 (2001).
116 The three strategies were “recalling themselves as transgressor,” “imagining how
they would feel if they were the transgressor,” and “imagining how the transgressor felt.”
In a fourth (control) condition, subjects were asked to “imagine the situation from your
own perspective.” Takaku, supra note 75, at 494.
117 See generally Bennett & Dewberry, supra note 76.
118 Choi & Severson, supra note 70, at 818 (victim reported that telling the offender
“No, I don’t accept this” was never an option).
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Surprisingly, in contrast to all the empirical attention paid to the effects
of apologies on recipients, comparatively little attention has been paid to the
potential effects of making apologies on apologizers themselves. There are
only two experimental studies of which we are aware, and their findings
seem, at least at first blush, to diverge. In one experiment, researchers found
that subjects asked to imagine themselves seeking forgiveness felt less
sadness, anger, shame, and guilt— and correspondingly more hope—about
themselves and their situation than those who simply thought about their
transgressions. 119 Forgiveness-seeking imagery also produced positive
physiological changes in subjects, including reduced muscle tension.120 In a
second study,121 however, researchers found that at least in some settings,
participant decisions122 to refuse to apologize increased their self-esteem and
sense of power and control. Taken together, these studies underscore what is
already well known to mediators: The psychology of apology is complicated.
Clearly, more research into these effects is warranted.

F. Mediation Questions and Applications
While many of the foregoing findings may not seem surprising, for
practicing mediators they raise as many questions as they answer. First,
because of the complexity of apologies and party resistance to both making
and receiving them, this form of persuasion often requires lengthy private
caucusing sessions, in which apologies may have to have to be cajoled,
rehearsed and then orchestrated in joint session by the mediator. Are
apologies produced by such a process likely to be perceived as sincere? Are
they apt to be effective?
Second, as to the impact of lawyers: The research seems to confirm what
is often discussed half-jokingly (“There is no 1/3 contingent fee in an
apology”) among mediators: that the presence of lawyers may pose a
119 Witvliet, et al., supra note 71, at 224.
120 Id. at 227.
121 See generally Okimoto et al., supra note 71.
122 In Study 1, university student participants were asked to imagine a scenario in

which a campus food services cashier mistakenly gave them extra $10 in change, which
they kept. They were then discovered to have taken the extra money and required by the
cashier to return it, and also asked to apologize. Study 2 utilized a recall methodology, in
which participants were asked to recall their reactions to a personal situation in which
“you did something that upset someone,” whether or not it was your fault, and either
apologized or did not. (emphasis added). In both studies, we would note, the participants’
culpability was either shared with another person or unclear, increasing the likelihood
that they might resist giving an apology. Id.
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significant impediment to harnessing the power of apology. But why? Is it a
generalized reluctance to make an apology, for fear that if the mediation
should fail, it will be viewed as an admission of liability (defense lawyers)?
A concern that it will make one’s clients less assertive than they would
otherwise be in vindicating their rights, resulting in possible long-term regret
about any settlement that is reached? (Both plaintiffs and defendants)? A
concern about fees (both sides, but especially plaintiffs’ personal injury
lawyers)? A blind spot, based on the limitations of their training, to all things
non-legal and non-monetary? A “total zeal” definition of their ethical
responsibilities? Some of these concerns might be overcome by the
mediator’s working with counsel separately in advance of the mediation. But
it would be useful to know more about why lawyers and apologies “don’t
mix.”
It is noteworthy that, like much of the empirical work on this topic,
Professor Robbennolt’s study examined lawyers’ reactions to unprompted,
unilateral, “full legal admission” (“I want to let you know how sorry I am.
The accident was my fault.”) sorts of apologies which, experience suggests,
are comparatively rare in mediation. What about apologies in more typical
cases, where there is evidence of fault and responsibility on both sides?
Might it be easier to persuade lawyers to accede to an apology in situations
where an exchange of apologies is possible? Might their advice to a client
change if instead of having to make a unilateral apology, both sides’
willingness to admit some fault might prompt a mutual softening of positions
and ease resolution? Mediators might be able to point out these advantages
when working with lawyers.
What about apologies that address intangible harms and interests, but do
not go directly to the legal merits? There are many potential gradations here,
ranging from purely “social” sorts of apologies (e.g., lawyer to opposing
party: “I’m really sorry that I kept you waiting almost an hour for the
deposition last week. I know you were busy and I’m sure it screwed up your
day.”) to apologies for acts that do not directly establish legal liability, but
nonetheless might hold sway if testified to in court (e.g., “I want to
acknowledge the impersonal way you were laid off, after so many years of
service to the company. We handled it very badly and we truly regret it.”) We
would hypothesize that the less an apology goes to the merits of a claim or
defense, the more open most lawyers would be to allowing it to be made.
Further investigation of these and other variables that arise in “lawyered”
disputes would be useful.
Frantz & Bennigson’s findings123 on the optimal timing for apologies
123 See supra text accompanying note 112.
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(not too early, and after the injured person has had an opportunity fully to
vent his feelings and tell his story) are consistent with the procedural justice
literature on the importance of “voice” in fairness judgments and
disputing,124 as well as with everyday experience in interpersonal conflicts
(e.g., “Your apology is all well and good. But I’m not ready to forgive you
yet.”). The research has not examined the circumstances under which an
apology might be offered too late to be helpful in resolving mediated
disputes. Is there a point after which apologies begin to lose their persuasive
power? For example, once serious bargaining begins over money or
resources, do attempted apologies begin to look like tactical ploys and thus
seem insincere to the recipient?
The scant research on the effects on apologizers of making amends
leaves open many important questions for mediators—perhaps especially
those who might see the active orchestration of an apology from a reluctant
party as excessive mediator intervention. We would hypothesize that an
apology—even or perhaps especially from a reluctant apologizer—would in
many cases have a significant persuasive effect on him or her, and could
induce a softening in negotiation stance. There are a number of reasons why
this might be so. Like role reversal, the act of apologizing can be seen as an
exercise in counter-attitudinal advocacy, with the resistant disputant led to
consider (and articulate) his own contribution to a dispute and its impact on
another person—thoughts and feelings that are unlikely to be paramount in
his mind because of anxiety about legal exposure, denial, shame or other
inhibitions. Goffman’s theoretical work suggests that helping a disputant
separate his past (regrettable) acts from his essential (positive) selfhood may
be a highly effective form of self-persuasion. Cognitive dissonance scholars
have found that dissonance effects are strongest (and self-persuasion
greatest) when a person’s actions are inconsistent with his or her self-concept
of being a good person.125 Given the lasting attitude changes that other
124 See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice:
Combined Impact of Voice and Improvement on Perceived Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (1977); E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & P. Christopher Earley, Voice,
Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990). See also, generally, Nancy
A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow
Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002).
125 Quoting Aronson, supra note 22, at 876: “The theory most associated with the
phenomenon of self-persuasion is Leon Festenger’s theory of cognitive dissonance . . .
[which] states that dissonance (an unpleasant feeling) is aroused when an individual says
or does something that runs counter to his or her own beliefs, especially if this action
threatens the individual’s self-concept of being a decent or rational person (emphasis
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role-playing experiments have demonstrated,126 this topic seems ripe for
further study.
Research into why people resist apologizing and how apologizers
respond to their own acts of contrition might even shed light on the question
of “orchestrated” apologies. If a disputant’s resistance is based on guilt or
shame associated with behavioral lapses that have harmed others, might the
ritual act of apologizing–especially if greeted by acceptance—lead such
inhibiting feelings to abate, and actual (if previously denied) remorse to
surface and be felt? Viewed this way, a skilled mediator’s intervention in
appropriate situations might convert an apparently “fake” apology by a
reluctant disputant into a genuine one.
Finally, while empirical research suggests that apologies hold the
promise of inducing significant attitude changes, helping parties express and
receive apologies effectively requires a rather sophisticated diagnostic,
intuitive and interpersonal skill set. This suggests that, to a greater extent
than other modes of persuasion surveyed in this article, working effectively
with apologies may require specialized training or cross-disciplinary
collaboration for most mediators.

IV. PERSUASION BY RHETORICAL QUESTIONING
Suppose you have been unable to persuade the participants in the
Halverson matter to engage in a meaningful apology exchange. The
defendants reluctantly agreed to improve their offer to $20,000 to settle the
case, an amount that the plaintiff immediately and emphatically rejected.
You sense that pointing out the company’s liability risks and its costs of
proceeding to litigation—interventions you have sought to avoid up to
now—are the best (and perhaps only) hope of obtaining further movement
towards a settlement.
In considering how to try to accomplish this, two possible approaches
have occurred to you:
(A) Tell the defendants the legal and factual weaknesses and costs as you
see them. (“From where I sit, this case will almost surely get to a jury. She
makes a very good witness. And especially if those sexist remarks come into
evidence you could be facing substantial exposure—including counsel fees.”
or “Merits aside, a hearing officer or jury may not like the way you laid her
off.”)
added). To reduce dissonance, people will try to bring those disparate cognitions into
greater harmony.”
126 See supra text accompanying note 31.
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(B) Ask them questions that suggest the legal risks you see (“Aren’t you
concerned with how a jury might react if the supervisors’ sexist remarks come
into evidence?”), the costs of going forward (“Is it really in your interest to
have the commission’s investigators coming to your offices, interviewing your
staff, and combing through your files?”), or both.
If you prefer alternative (B), you have lots of company. “The widely
accepted persuasive technique of asking, then answering the question posed,
is deeply rooted in Western rhetorical tradition. Demetrius advised rhetors to
build force by asking audiences questions without giving answers . . . .
Consistent with this rhetorical legacy, modern persuaders receive advice to
use rhetorical questions to affirm or deny a point by asking an emphatic
question to which no overt answer is expected.”127
A leading divorce text describes question-asking as “the core technique
[of counselors and mediators]” and a “more widely acceptable mediational
approach [than making statements].”128 Many mediation theorists echo this
view. Professor Lela Love, in discussing the mediator’s duty to assure that
participants are making fully informed decisions, captured it this way:
“asking questions [regarding possible legal outcomes] comports with the
mediator’s role, but giving or suggesting answers does not.”129
Why do so many mediators prefer to ask questions rather than make
statements when seeking to persuade? For some, this grammatical form is a
matter of ideology: in general, questions seem less argumentative or
pressuring–qualities that are anathema to widely-accepted norms of mediator
neutrality and party self-determination. In addition, when statements pertain
to probable legal outcomes, some mediators and theorists fear they may
amount to providing legal advice, which they view as improper.130
For other neutrals, not ideologically opposed to evaluation per se, asking
127 Barbara Mae Gayle, Raymond W. Preiss & Mike Allen, Another Look at the Use

of Rhetorical Questions, in PERSUASION: ADVANCES THROUGH META-ANALYSIS 189
(Mike Allen & Raymond W. Preiss eds. 1998).
128 JAY FOLBERG, ANN MILNE & PETER SALEM, DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION:
MODELS, TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 86 (2004).
129 Symposium, Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 95, 108 (1995) (comments of Lela Love).
130 As we have written elsewhere, attempts to distinguish providing parties
appropriate legal “information” from (arguably inappropriate) legal “advice” are
inherently problematic, and regulatory efforts to ensure that non-lawyer mediators
providing evaluative mediation do not engage in the unauthorized practice of law are
greatly complicated by the fact the “practice of law” is defined very differently in
different jurisdictions. See James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some
Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator,
38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 784–88 (1997); FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 333–35.
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questions may provide a measure of comfort: doubt can be sown without
having to make definitive predictions in an unpredictable legal world. Still
others may view questions as being more likely than statements to engage a
subject, or less likely to trigger resistance to the persuasive effort.
In considering the efficacy of rhetorical questioning as a mode of
persuasion, we should make clear at the outset what we are and are not
talking about. Research demonstrates that most effective persuasion is done
with others, not to them. Competent adults generally cannot be persuaded to
do something unless they want to do it. Effective persuasion is therefore an
interactive process, in which the persuader must work closely with her
subject to evaluate whether the advantages of taking a certain course of
action outweigh the disadvantages.131 In general, questioning and dialogue
are vital parts of that process.132
Here, however, we are concerned with the efficacy of a more narrow, but
nonetheless commonly employed, form of mediator questioning: the highly
suggestive rhetorical question, i.e., one whose answer is implicit and
understood by the receiver, and to which no overt response is expected. Such
questions are sometimes planted by mediators acting as “agents of reality” in
order to sow doubt, and hopefully, attitude change.133
What do we actually know about the relative effectiveness of such
questions—as compared to statements--in changing attitudes? Research
concerning the effectiveness of rhetorical questioning in persuasion is not as
rigorous or uniform as one might like. Nonetheless, it tends to suggest that in
settings like mediation, rhetorical questions may not be effective as a
persuasion device, and under certain circumstances may even be
counter-productive.

A. Rhetorical Questions and Cognitive Elaboration
A key determinant of the success of an attempt to persuade is the extent
to which the message causes the subject to think about or “elaborate” on its

131 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 228.
132 See Kolb, supra note 14, at 472–73 (quoting Lawrence Susskind for the

proposition that “questioning is a way to teach without lecturing.”)
133 Even within this definition, there are a range of question forms and tones
that—viewed in their context—can serve this function. “How do you think a judge will
rule?” or “Have you talked with a lawyer about your case?” are questions that may seem
open-ended and free from suggestion. But, if, for example, they followed or preceded a
discussion of case weaknesses, or were asked in a skeptical tone, they might be highly
suggestive of the mediator’s views.
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argument content.134 According to this view, greater cognitive elaboration
should yield more positive and negative thoughts about a message, either
increasing or decreasing its persuasive effect on attitudes depending on how
strong or weak the message is. Where a message—especially a
counter-attitudinal one that challenges a recipient’s existing view—contains
strong arguments, persuasion is enhanced by maximizing the recipient’s
thinking about those arguments. Early researchers hypothesized that
questions are superior to statements in encouraging the subject to continue to
think or be curious about the arguments that have preceded or will follow the
question (or, where the question is a rhetorical one, that may be imbedded in
the question itself). And indeed, some earlier research indicated that
questions elicit more cognitions than statements.135
It was later found, however, that this elaboration effect may be limited to
“low involvement” subjects. 136 Where (as in mediation) the recipient is
already “high involvement”—i.e., personally affected by and likely already
to be engaged in deep thought about the subject matter of message—a
rhetorical question may serve as a distraction that can interfere with message
elaboration and reduce persuasion.
In one well-known study,137 undergraduates were presented with both
stronger and weaker audio-taped arguments in favor of a proposed
comprehensive pre-graduation examination, which culminated in either a
statement summarizing the arguments or a rhetorical (leading) question
suggesting a conclusion. The goal was to measure which grammatical
format—statement or question—would yield the most elaboration of the
persuasive message.
Where students had low involvement in the subject matter (the exam
would be introduced at another school, not theirs) questions yielded more
thoughts (positive thoughts when accompanied by strong arguments;
negative thoughts when accompanied by weak ones) than statements. But
134 This is known as the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. See Richard E.
Petty & Duane T. Wegener, The Elaboration Likelihood Model: Current Status and
Controversies, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Shelly Chaiken &
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
135 Dolf Zillmann & Joanne R. Cantor, Rhetorical Elicitation of Concession in
Persuasion, 94 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 223 (1974); Dolf Zillmann & Joanne R. Cantor,
Induction of Curiosity Via Rhetorical Questions and its Effect on the Learning of Factual
Materials, 43 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 172 (1973).
136 Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo & Martin Heesacker, Effects of Rhetorical
Questions on Persuasion: A Cognitive Response Analysis, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 432, 439 (1981).
137 Id.
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where students were high involvement—they had a stake in the result
because the exam would be given to them—the rhetorical question distracted
them from their argument processing and actually reduced the level of
cognition about the persuasive message.138

B. Rhetorical Questions, Source Assessment and Persuasion
Rhetorical questions can also have the effect of focusing attention on the
source of the persuasion in ways that may undermine persuasive efforts. One
illustrative study—of reactions to advertisements for running shoes—sought
to measure whether the grammatical form of the persuasive effort (statements
vs. questions) affected perceptions of the message source and its tactics.139
To introduce the source emphasis, subjects were given information about the
shoe company (one group was told the company was socially responsible, the
other that it was not). One version of the ad made use of questions, the other
only statements, to convey the same message content.
Subjects who had “persuasion knowledge”—were knowledgeable about
or sensitive to persuasion tactics—found the use of questions (as compared to
the more straightforward or direct approach of using statements) to be a
deviation from their expectations. That reaction led them to try to understand
that deviation in terms of the advertiser’s motives, i.e., they focused more on
the source and its tactics than the message content. And where their
assessment of the message source was unfavorable, subjects exposed to
questions were less persuaded and perceived the advertiser to be significantly
more pressuring (and its tactics less appropriate) than those who read the
same message in statement form.140
A pair of experimental studies by John Swasy and James Munch
attempted to synthesize some of the early research by comparing the impact
of rhetorical questions versus statements on cognitive elaboration, source

138 Id. at 438.
139 Rohini Ahluwalia & Robert E. Burnkrant, Answering Questions about

Questions: A Persuasion Knowledge Perspective for Understanding the Effects of
Rhetorical Questions, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 26 (June 2004).
140 Id. at 32. The authors add that the advertising message content can itself affect
perceptions of its source, with comparative ads and fear appeals tending to produce
negative source evaluations. Id. at 40. Others have suggested that rhetorical questions
might affect perception of the source of the message positively, by making the speaker
either seem warmer or less assertive. See, e.g., Nora Newcombe & Diane B. Arnkoff,
Effects of Speech Style and Sex of Speaker on Person Perception, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1293 (1979).
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assessment and overall persuasiveness.141 Replicating and extending earlier
studies testing high vs. low involvement students’ attitudes about a required
college comprehensive exam,142 they found, among other things, that: (a)
fewer message arguments were recalled when rhetorical questions rather than
statements were used in high involvement situations; (b) questioners were
perceived as less expert—but no more polite—than statement makers in
strong argument conditions; and (c) the use of a series of rhetorical questions
(rather than only one) increased the perception of pressure, increased
subjects’ derogation of the source, and (most importantly) reduced message
acceptance.

C. Mediation Applications and Questions
While some of this data may raise doubt about the conventional wisdom
of using questions rather than statements to persuade, the overall picture is
far from conclusive. Researchers have not agreed on any common definition
or schema for rhetorical questions. For example, is there one only form of
rhetorical question or are there many?143 Researchers have reached differing
conclusions about the persuasive effect of rhetorical questions, but they have
studied different grammatical question forms, different placement (e.g. as an
introduction versus as a conclusion) of rhetorical questions in an argument
and different frequency of rhetorical question usage in an argument, all of
which may have affected their results.144
Most of the experimental settings discussed above also involved strictly
rhetorical questions in the sense that no response was expected—or indeed
even possible—within the research design. Few mediators (in contrast to
mass advertisers or jury trial lawyers) would attempt such a non-interactive
form of persuasion, given the intimate face-to-face setting in which they
141 John L. Swasy & James M. Munch, Examining the Target of Receiver
Elaborations: Rhetorical Question Effects on Source Processing and Persuasion, 11 J.
CONSUMER RES. 877 (1985); James M. Munch & John L. Swasy, Rhetorical Question,
Summarization Frequency, and Argument Strength Effects on Recall, 15 J. CONSUMER
RES. 69 (1988).
142 Petty, Cacioppo & Heesacker, supra note 136.
143 See, e.g., Gayle, Preiss & Allen, supra note 127, at 190.
144 As one meta-analysis put it: “Aggregated effect sizes indicate that rhetorical
questions are not potent persuasive tools. However, the host of related message feature
[variables] preclude us from asserting that rhetorical questions disrupt the production of
thoughts to distract the receiver, exert social pressure on the receiver to conform, direct
the receiver’s attention to opposing arguments, or do not create a minimal intent to
persuade.” Id. at 198.
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work. Moreover, when mediators use questions to persuade, the context—the
stage of the proceedings (often late, with limited time remaining), earlier
information or arguments (often including the opponents’ arguments) from
which the questions stem, previous efforts to persuade and the subject’s
reactions to them, how authoritative the neutral appears, how savvy about
persuasion the recipient is—may all affect how a participant perceives even
an innocuous or objectively open-ended question, much less a leading or
suggestive one.
Many of these studies compared the effects of rhetorical questions to
comparable statements when used in conjunction with persuasive arguments.
But some mediators are reluctant to use “arguments” at all. What about the
relative merits of just questions versus just statements without accompanying
(before or after) arguments?145
Assuming that the use of rhetorical questions poses at least some risk of
undercutting persuasion, mediators who seek to use questions to sow doubt
might be advised first to seek to lower a subject’s ego involvement—
lessening how much he feels directly affected by or cares about a particular
outcome—so as to open him up to thinking about the message. This might be
done by attempting to foster empathy for the other side, developing
attractive, alternative ideas for settlement, re-framing to highlight positives,
lowering perceived stakes, and other similar interventions.
To reduce the potential for questions to appear as deviations from what is
expected (with the attendant risk of turning the focus toward the source and
his tactics), mediators might also do well to prepare participants for their use
in advance. (For example, in a divorce mediation: “Ms. Avery, it’s my job to
make sure you’ve really considered all the ways that this situation might look
to a judge. By asking you some questions, it’s my hope that they will prompt
you to put aside for a moment your views of the right outcome and consider
other possibilities . . . . Now a few minutes ago, you said that Mr. Avery had
worked two jobs to pay your nursing school tuition. Do you really think he’ll
only get 10% credit for his economic contributions when it comes time to
divide up the equity in your home?”) But might not such transparency also
increase anticipation, and thus resistance and counter-arguing?146
145 Some older research, which is far from accepted, suggests that we are

conditioned to associate rhetorical or leading questions with strong (embedded)
arguments and thus such questions will be more persuasive than statements making the
same arguments. See Dolf Zillmann, Rhetorical Elicitation of Agreement in Persuasion,
21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 159 (1972).
146 See, e.g., William L. Benoit, Forewarning and Persuasion, in PERSUASION:
ADVANCES THROUGH META0ANALYSIS 146 (Mike Allen & Raymond W. Preiss, eds.,
1998) (Meta-analytic study concluding that “[f]orewarning an audience to expect a
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Despite some methodological limitations of this body of research,
persuasion by narrow, suggestive questioning seems at the very least risky.
The risk of a party’s focusing on the persuader and his tactics rather than the
message may raise particular challenges when used by (ostensibly-neutral)
mediators. A mediator’s rhetorical questions are often indirect evaluative
efforts to overcome overconfidence by instilling doubt or even fear. Can such
“negative” appeals, especially since they may also be seen as indirect
endorsements of the opponent’s stance, by themselves lead to lowered
assessment of the source (the mediator) and, in turn, lowered odds of
persuasion?147 If so, straightforward statements may be the best form of
evaluation.

V. PERSUASION BY DIRECT STATEMENTS
Suppose that in the Halverson case, an evidentiary dispute has arisen
between the lawyers about the significance and likely admissibility into
evidence of the episode in which Ms. Halverson publicly “disrespected” her
supervisors after initially being passed over for promotion. Ms. Halverson’s
attorney argues that while this episode was certainly unfortunate, it is
inadmissible, inasmuch as the defendant has alleged in its pleadings that
“purely economic considerations” prompted the company to lay Ms.
Halverson off, not alleged poor relations with supervisors or a lack of
on-the-job diplomacy. The company’s attorney calls this argument
“hyper-technical,” adding that a host of job performance factors—including
the plaintiff’s mercurial temperament and growing job dissatisfaction after
she was passed over for promotion—went into the decision to let her (and not
someone else) go in a severe economic downturn.
At this point in the mediation, the plaintiff has lowered her demand to
$80,000 to settle the case. You believe that her position on the
inadmissibility of this evidence is unrealistic and have offered to give her and
her lawyer, in caucus, some feedback on that point. They have indicated
receptivity to hearing your views. When you do so, what form of statement is
likely to be most persuasive? Consider the following options:
(A) A one-sided statement of your views, with reasons briefly stated.
(“The standard of relevance is, as you know, very broad. My opinion,
unfortunately, is that this episode is relevant and admissible to show why the
company chose your client in particular to lay off in an admittedly tough
economic climate.”)
persuasive message tends to make that message less persuasive.”).
147 See Ahluwalia & Burnkrant, supra note 139, at 39–40.
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(B) A two-sided message, which acknowledges arguments on both sides
of the question, but does not take a position between them. (“There is no
doubt that the inconsistency between the defendant’s claim in their answer
that they acted solely for business reasons and the position they are taking
now raises questions, and you can argue their lack of credibility at a hearing.
And it’s possible that a hearing officer would go so far as to bar them from
clarifying their position at trial. But it’s also quite possible that the
defendant’s answer in the case would not preclude them from clarifying or
even modifying their story at trial. As you know, the standard of relevance is
very broad.”)
(C) A two-sided message, which acknowledges arguments on both sides
of the question, and explains briefly why one side is more likely to prevail
than another. (“There is no doubt that the inconsistency between the
defendant’s claim in their answer that they acted solely for business reasons
and the position they are taking now raises questions, and you can argue their
lack of credibility at a hearing. And it’s possible that a hearing officer would
go so far as to bar them from clarifying their position at trial. But
unfortunately, I think that is extremely unlikely. After all, saying that they
acted for reasons of business exigency does not logically preclude them from
arguing that they also acted for performance-based reasons. When cuts need
to be made for business reasons, employers usually consider performance in
deciding which particular employees to lay off. And, and as you know, the
standard of relevance is very broad.”)
(D) A two-sided message, which gives detailed and explicit reasons why
one side is more likely to prevail than another, and also provides explicit
conclusions that flow therefrom. (“There is no doubt that the inconsistency
between the defendant’s claim in their answer that they acted solely for
business reasons and the position they are taking now raises questions, and
you can argue their lack of credibility at a hearing. And it’s possible that a
hearing officer would go so far as bar them from clarifying their position at
trial. But unfortunately, I think that is extremely unlikely. After all, saying that
they acted for reasons of business exigency does not logically preclude them
from arguing that they also acted for performance-based reasons. When cuts
need to be made for business reasons, employers usually consider
performance in deciding which particular employees to lay off. And, even if
their statements are viewed as inconsistent, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, that when a defendant
in an employment discrimination case takes a position in the pleadings that is
inconsistent with the position it later takes at trial, this does not necessarily
raise an inference of unlawful discrimination. A defendant in an employment
discrimination case may conceal its true position in a pleading simply
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because it did not want to have to say anything personal or negative about the
plaintiff. That could be what happened here. Unfortunately, I think the whole
embarrassing episode will come in, and a hearing officer—or jury, if this case
ends up in court—will hear all about it.”)
Perhaps the answer is obvious, but if you chose option D, empirical
studies tell us you are correct. “Two-sided refutational messages”—messages
that present two (or more) sides to an issue or question, but then present
reasons why one side is more persuasive than the other(s)—are more
persuasive than either one-sided messages or two-sided, non-refutational
messages. In addition, explicit arguments—arguments that state explicit
reasons for a conclusion and describe those conclusions in detail—are more
persuasive than arguments with implicit reasons and/or implicit (or no)
conclusions.

A. Message “Sidedness”
Is it effective for persuaders to go beyond their own points of view and
both acknowledge and refute opposing arguments? Empirical research on
message sidedness is substantial, dating back more than sixty years. A 1999
meta-analytic review summarizes and analyzes persuasion effects from 107
investigations of the topic, involving more than 20,000 respondents.148
This review analyzes a wide variety of variables, including the effect of
message sidedness on perception of messenger credibility vs. effect on actual
persuasion outcome; differential effects of message sidedness for consumer
advertising vs. non-advertising messages (messages typically involving
political or social questions, as to which respondents—as in mediation—may
have strong opinions); whether the two-sided message is refutational (e.g.,
one that “attacks the plausibility of opposing arguments”) or non-refutational
(one that “acknowledges the opposing considerations, but does not attempt to
refute them directly”); and the ordering of the message (supporting
arguments, then opposing ones? Opposing arguments, then supporting ones?
Interwoven discussion of supporting and opposing arguments?)
The principal findings of this study are as follows: First, there is, overall,
“no dependable difference in persuasive effectiveness between one-sided and
two-sided messages.”149 However, refutational two-sided messages enjoy “a
148 See Daniel O’Keefe, How to Handle Opposing Arguments in Persuasive
Messages: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of One-Sided and Two-Sided Messages,
22 COMM. Y.B. 209–49 (1999), (listing studies). Another useful meta-analytic review is
Allen, supra note 18 at 87–98.
149 O’Keefe, supra note 148, at 218.
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dependable persuasive advantage over one-sided messages.”150 This effect is
especially strong for non-advertising messages. 151 By contrast,
non-refutational two-sided messages are “significantly less persuasive than
their one-sided counterparts,” both for advertising and non-advertising
messages.152 Finally, the ordering of a message does not appear significantly
to affect its persuasiveness.153
The author discusses the fact that one might expect refutational
two-sided arguments to be less persuasive than non-refutational arguments
because they might appear to involve greater pressure to adopt the
persuader’s position, and thereby arouse reactance (a desire to fight back and
thereby establish one’s decisional autonomy) in the recipient.154 Why is this
not borne out by the research? Do refutational arguments convey greater
authoritativeness? Do non-refutational messages “[leave] open the possibility
that an opposing view may have some merit”?155 Or that the speaker lacks
confidence? These questions and others warrant further research, but the
review concludes: “in non-advertising contexts, persuaders would generally
be well-advised to employ refutational two-sided messages in preference to
one-sided or non-refutational two-sided messages. In such contexts,
refutational messages enjoy . . . significantly greater persuasiveness than do
one-sided messages, and non-refutational messages are dependably less
persuasive than one-sided messages.”156
Researchers have also extensively investigated both argument
justification explicitness and conclusion explicitness and their persuasive
effects. Two articles provide very useful meta-analytic summaries of each of
these lines of research.157
150 Id. See also Allen, supra note 18 (1998 meta-analysis reaching generally similar

conclusions).
151 O’Keefe, supra note 148, at 231.
152 Id. at 218–19.
153 Id. at 219. In the discussion section of his article, the author also notes with
interest the “absence of a general parallelism between effects on persuasiveness and
effects on credibility.” It might be thought, for example, that two-sided messages are
more persuasive than one-sided messages because, by presenting two or more sides of a
question, a persuader appears balanced and fair, thereby enhancing her credibility with
her subject. But messenger credibility is not the only factor influencing overall message
persuasiveness. Id. at 233–34.
154 Id. at 235, citing BREHM & BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 238–39.
157 Daniel J. O’Keefe, Justification Explicitness and Persuasive Effect: A
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B. Argument Explicitness
Most communication theorists believe that argumentative explicitness
(rather than evasion and concealment) is desirable as a normative matter in
argument. 158 But a person interested in persuasion might nonetheless
legitimately fear that, rather enhancing persuasive effect, more explicit
arguments impair persuasive effect, by making more obvious what claims are
being advanced and thereby “enlarg[ing] the apparent ‘disagreement
space.’”159 Are explicit messages more credibility-enhancing or persuasive
than those that are not? One meta-analytic review concludes that in general,
“advocates have little to fear from making their argumentative support
explicit.”160
The author focuses on three aspects of argumentative explicitness: the
explicitness with which the advocate identifies the source of information and
opinion relied on; the completeness of the arguments themselves (explicit
articulation of premises, supporting information, etc.); and “quantitative
specificity” (e.g., “seventy-five percent of the cases I have volunteered to
mediate have settled” versus “Most of the cases I have volunteered to
mediate have settled.”) The data analysis suggests that arguments that (a)
explicitly reveal their sources or (b) provide more explicit argumentative
support “are significantly more credible and significantly more persuasive
than their less explicit counterparts.”161 Surprisingly, quantitatively explicit
Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of Varying Support Articulation in Persuasive
Messages, 35 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY 61 (1998) [hereinafter Justification
Explicitness] (23 investigations, 5,358 participants); Daniel J. O’Keefe, Standpoint
Explicitness and Persuasive Effect: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of Varying
Conclusion Articulation in Persuasive Messages, 34 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOCACY 1, 6
(1997) (32 investigations, 13,754 participants) [hereinafter Standpoint Explicitness]. On
the difficulties of accurately measuring explicitness in argumentation, see generally,
Stefanie Alexa Stadler, Coding Speech Acts for their Degree of Explicitness, 43 J.
PRAGMATICS 36 (2011).
158 O’Keefe, Justification Explicitness, supra note 157, at 61. See, e.g., also, DEIDRE
D. JOHNSTON, THE ART & SCIENCE OF PERSUASION 53–54, 59 (1994) (arguing that ethical
persuasion is characterized by honesty, directness and disclosure of relevant information,
rather than false pretenses and evasion).
159 O’Keefe, Justification Explicitness, supra note 157.
160 Id. at 68.
161 A caveat that O’Keefe notes is that these effects most probably depend on the
character and quality of the articulated support. However, there is not much research on
this point, as most of the research studies involve plainly relevant arguments advanced by
likely high credibility sources. He calls for more research on this question. Id. at 68–69.
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arguments are not more credible or persuasive than qualitative arguments, at
least not in a statistically significant way.
What is the most likely explanation for these effects? One hypothesis is
that explicit arguments are more persuasive because they enhance the
credibility of the speaker. That is, receivers might be thought to use a
credibility heuristic to evaluate the persuasiveness of a message. However,
the data does not appear to support this “explicitness-as-credibility heuristic”
analysis. 162 Alternatively, it may be the case that “explicit supporting
argumentation directly enhances belief in the relevant supporting argument
and thereby makes the message more persuasive.”163 But here too the data is
inconclusive. Overall, the research thus far has not isolated specific
properties that make explicit arguments more or less persuasive.164

C. Conclusion Explicitness
A second meta-analytic review examines another aspect of
argumentative explicitness: “the degree of articulation given to the
advocate’s overall conclusion.”165 Examining the research in the field, the
author of the study notes that there are two bodies of research relating to this
question and two ways that an argument’s conclusion could be considered
inexplicit: (a) by omitting any conclusion at all (“conclusion omission”
studies) or (b) by stating a conclusion in a non-specific way (“conclusion
specificity” studies).166
“It is an empirical question,” the author writes, “whether argumentative
explicitness inevitably sacrifices instrumental success.” Those who seek to
persuade might legitimately fear that more explicit conclusions are less
persuasive because they could (a) increase “disagreement space” (as
discussed in the previous study), or (b) cause “boomerang effects,” either by
insulting an audience with obvious messages, or by causing anger if the
message is perceived as “aggressive, insistent or directive.” This might in
turn induce reactance in the recipient–a “motivational state of mind aimed at
reestablishing freedom of action.”167 Conversely, an advocate might suppose
that a less explicit message is more persuasive because it stimulates the

162 Id. at 70–71.
163 Id. at 71, emphasis added.
164 Id. at 71–72.
165 O’Keefe, Standpoint Explicitness, supra note 157, at 1.
166 Id. at 3–5.
167 Id. at 2.
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audience’s active participation, requiring them to “fill in the blanks.”168
Analyzing eighteen studies involving conclusion specificity, with a total
of 11,105 participants, and fourteen studies involving conclusion omission,
with a total of 2649 participants, the review concludes first, that messages
with explicit overall conclusions are significantly more persuasive than
messages without conclusions; and second, that messages with more specific
conclusions are significantly more persuasive than messages with
generalized conclusions. Although sample sizes were small, these effects
seem to hold true irrespective of a recipient’s pre-existing (favorable or
unfavorable) viewpoints—i.e., they apply even when message recipients are
“dug in” against a persuasive message.169
Why are less explicit arguments less persuasive? The receiver may
misperceive a less explicit message—assuming either that it is more similar
to his own view than it actually is (and therefore less attitude change is
necessary); or conversely that it is more discrepant from his own than it
actually is (which might induce reactance and make the message less
persuasive).170 Alternatively, specific conclusions—detailed descriptions of
a suggested course of action—may be more persuasive because they better
enable the message recipient to imagine future behavior that is different from
previous behavior. This is in accord with a line of research suggesting that
“imagining future behavior” makes that behavior more likely by increasing
perceived behavioral control.171 The author of the study concludes: “When
normatively-good argumentative practices interfere with persuasive success,
advocates will face the unhappy choice of being good and being effective.”
But advocates face no such difficult choice because argumentative
explicitness, considered a normative good, is also persuasive.172

168 Id.
169 Id. at 7. O’Keefe editorializes that these outcomes demonstrate the value of

meta-analytic analyses: Whereas individual studies sometimes don’t demonstrate these
effects, when the effects of individual studies are combined, the statistical significance of
the cumulative findings is very strong. Id. at 7–8.
170 Id. at 8–9. See also Michael G. Cruz, Explicit and Implicit Conclusions in
Persuasive Messages, in ALLEN & PREISS, supra note 18 at 217–30 (Meta-analytic
review, concluding that explicit messages were slightly more persuasive than implicit
ones, even with highly involved subjects, and arguing that explicit messages seem to be
better understood by recipients and therefore more likely to persuade. Furthermore,
contrary to conjecture by many previous authors, explicit conclusion drawing does not
negatively affect perceived source credibility.).
171 O’Keefe, Standpoint Explicitness, supra note 157, at 9.
172 Id. at 10.
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D. Mediation Applications and Questions
What applicability might these findings have to the work of mediators? It
might be argued that disputants in mediation will generally be more resistant
than “typical” persuasion subjects to explicit refutational statements because
of the expectation of strict impartiality and neutrality by their mediator.
While there may be specific mediation cultures in which this is true (and a
mediator who promises the parties that she will not make legal statements or
predictions may face party resistance—and reactance—if she attempts to do
so thereafter), we doubt that it is true as a general proposition. Studies tend to
show that many disputants want and expect feedback and evaluation from
their mediators.173
The general findings about the persuasiveness of explicit messaging
should have considerable potential significance for mediators, who, for a
variety of reasons, may tend to “pull their punches” in delivering messages or
making suggestions that aim to challenge a disputant’s current attitude. An
intriguing question is whether the level of outcome-directiveness of an
explicit evaluative statement affects its persuasiveness. There are many
gradations of feedback and evaluation.174 A mediator who explains in detail
to a corporate executive why litigating a contested matter may not be the best
use of his staff’s time from a business standpoint is providing a common but
mild form of feedback. In the example at the beginning of this section, the
mediator provides a legal opinion about an evidentiary question–a more
directive intervention, but one that is considerably less so than, say,
providing a legal opinion about the predicted substantive outcome of a case
(“My sense is that if the case goes to trial, the plaintiff will almost certainly
get to the jury, and will likely win a verdict in the vicinity of $40,000 to
$65,000 . . . ”) or a specific settlement suggestion based on an evaluation of
the law and facts of the case (“If you want my opinion, I think their $50,000
settlement offer is right in the ballpark, and you would not be making a
mistake if you decided to accept it.”). Are explicit statements as persuasive
when they include outcome predictions or recommend particular solutions as
when they provide less directive forms of feedback? Might we generally
expect greater reactance from disputants as persuasive feedback becomes
173 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDIATION
QUALITY, FINAL REPORT (2008) (study showing, inter alia, that ninety-five percent of
attorney consumers of mediation wanted their mediators to give an analysis of the case,
including strengths and weaknesses).
174 See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 246–47, giving examples and citing
sources.
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more directive? Put slightly differently, does persuasion work in similar ways
when the persuader makes “is” statements (e.g., “The state of the law is [x]”)
as opposed to “ought” statements (“For [y] reasons, you might consider
lowering your demand.”)?175 Further research on such questions would be
useful.
Despite these questions, we believe that these findings shed potentially
significant new light on two important debates in mediation. First, there is
the much debated question regarding the relative importance of process
expertise versus substantive expertise as a mediator qualification.176 In our
example above, the most persuasive message form, according to the research,
would be the one in which the mediator explicitly identified the source for
his conclusion, including discussing the potential impact of a U.S. Supreme
Court decision on the evidence question presented. It is doubtful whether a
mediator without substantial legal background in employment discrimination
law would be able to provide such feedback. If highly detailed and explicit
arguments and conclusions are more effective in persuasion than less explicit
or detailed ones, this suggests the importance of industry knowledge as a key
criterion for mediator success—at least when the parties want feedback.
Second, these lines of research shed light on longstanding theoretical
debates about facilitative versus evaluative mediation. In most professional
advising contexts, informational explicitness and directness are considered
positive and desirable. Most patients or clients, for example, want their
doctors or lawyers to lay out the pros and cons of differing courses of action
and their recommendations, with supporting reasons, why one course may be
preferable to another.177 Similarly, we want the salespeople with whom we
deal to be forthright about the characteristics, benefits, and weaknesses of the
various products or services we are considering buying.
In mediation, by contrast, the longstanding debate over facilitation versus
evaluation has led many neutrals who seek to persuade to avoid explicit or
direct efforts at persuasion, often in the name of party self-determination.
Even when feedback has been expressly requested by the parties, mediators
175 We are indebted to Ian Ayres for suggesting this distinction to us.
176 See, e.g., Margaret L. Shaw, Mediator Qualifications: A Report of a Symposium

on Critical Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 125 (1988);
Christopher Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 23 (1990).
177 See generally, e.g., RUTH R. FADDEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (informed consent duty of physicians); Jacqueline
Nolan-Haley, Agents and Informed Consent, in ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER &
CHRISTOPHER HONEYMAN, THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR
THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 505 (2006) (on the importance of client informed consent
in legal negotiation).
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may “hedge their bets” by giving half-baked evaluations or making
statements in an indirect, roundabout fashion, even regarding questions that
have clear answers—out of fear of being seen as favoring a side, appearing
coercive, or otherwise acting “inappropriately.” At a minimum, this body of
research suggests that such behaviors are suboptimal.

VI. PERSUASION BASED ON “NEGATIVE” EMOTIONS: FEAR AND GUILT
Suppose that your evidentiary predictions have not had the desired effect
in causing the plaintiff and her lawyer to be more realistic about their
settlement goals. You sense that Ms. Halverson, for many reasons, may not
be fully assessing the risks—and the impact on her—of a trial. If anything,
she and her lawyer seem to be getting less reasonable as the mediation
progresses. You think she has a substantial chance of losing the case
altogether if it is tried but that there is a good chance of getting the case
settled quickly if she is willing to drop her demand by, say, $25,000.
You are mulling over alternative ways of presenting this information.
One option is to try to incite fear, as in for example:
I think you have a substantial chance of losing at trial. Win or
lose, the incident in which you ‘dissed’ your employers in front of
your coworkers will almost certainly be rehashed in detail. They may
try to portray you as a loose cannon, irrational, disloyal, not a team
player. With so many people looking for work in this economy, your
conduct—even if it was justified—may look bad to a jury. In a slow
news cycle, this might even be the kind of story that a newspaper or
local TV station would want to cover. And if that occurs, the negative
publicity could really hurt your prospects of being re-employed—no
matter what else happened at trial.
What about attempting to tap into her possible guilt, for example:
I know you’ve struggled to raise your teenage son as a single
mom, first on your unemployment benefits and now with part-time
work. How would you feel about how you fulfilled your obligations to
him if you were to lose your case after a long wait for the trial,
knowing that you had the chance to receive some decent money in
mediation but turned it down?
Mediation theorists and practitioners have a complicated relationship
with the role of strong emotions in mediation. On the one hand, there is
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nearly universal acceptance of attempting to identify and (in non-destructive
ways) bring to the surface the emotions that drive the conflict.178 Mediation
trainers of all stripes and dispute resolution theorists have also focused a
good deal of attention on the ways in which positive emotions (hope, trust,
empathy, etc.) can lower tensions and reduce barriers to resolution.179 And
the notion of reality testing—i.e., encouraging parties to weigh how realistic
or attractive their non-settlement alternatives are, and how they might feel in
the future under different resolution scenarios–enjoys widespread support.180
On the other hand, many in the field might recoil at the suggestion that a
neutral would actively seek to evoke fear, guilt, or other “negative” emotions
in order to produce a shift in attitude. Apart from its normative implications,
there are more basic questions: do such approaches to persuasion work? If so,
how and under what circumstances?

A. Fear appeals
For more than a half-century, primarily in the areas of public health and
advertising, social scientists have studied the effectiveness of fear appeals in
seeking to influence behavior change. Early researchers saw such appeals in
purely emotional terms: the fear such messages aroused created unpleasant
effects, which drove subjects to seek relief by accepting the message’s
recommendation.181
But laboratory results did not bear this hypothesis out at very high levels
of aroused fear. The prevailing model was thus revised, with theorists
hypothesizing that increased fear would produce increased message
acceptance, but that after a certain optimal (moderate) level of emotional
178 See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 159–60; MARK D. BENNETT &
SCOTT HUGHES, THE ART OF MEDIATION 73–74 (2d. ed. 2005); William A. Donohue,
Communicative Competence in Mediators, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 322, 327–31 (Kenneth Kressel et al.,
eds.,1989).
179 See, e.g., JENNIFER E. BEER WITH EILEEN STIEF, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK
71–72 (1997); BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 8, at 124–26; Clark Freshman, Adele Hayes,
and Greg Feldman, The Lawyer-Negotiator as Mood Scientist: What We Know and Don’t
Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation, 2002 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 1
(2002); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1661 (1997).
180 See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 270–71; KIMBERLEE E. KOVACH,
MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 207 (3d. ed. 2004).
181 For a discussion of “drive” models depicting subjects as driven to reduce fear,
see Paul A. Mongeau, Another Look at Fear-Arousing Persuasive Appeals, in ALLEN &
PREISS, supra note 18, at 53.
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arousal, fear-based messages would “go too far” in their intensity, the level
of tension aroused would be too great to be eliminated by the action
recommended to the subject, and they would backfire in terms of
persuasion.182 However, this “curvilinear” effect, depicted graphically as an
inverted U, was never verified empirically.183
More recent public health research has found that stronger or more
intense fear messages do arouse more fear and overall are more persuasive in
producing a declared intention on the part of subjects to change their health
behavior. But, according to this research, fear does not necessarily operate as
originally believed. According to these findings, fear appeals produce not
only emotional responses but also cognitive (thinking/perceiving) ones, and
their effectiveness may be highly tied to, if not determined by, the thinking
they engender. 184 As fear appeal research continued in this direction,
meta-analyses have verified this emotion-reason interaction and have
attempted to explain when fear appeals are likely to work or fail.
According to several models,185 fear appeals can be broken down into
two parts: (a) the threat or danger facing the subject, and (b) the
recommended action or solution that the subject can take to avoid the harm.
Each of these, in turn, is comprised of two additional components, seen from
the subject’s perspective. A threat is judged by the subject on the basis of his
perception of (1) its severity and (2) its relevance—his chances of suffering
its effects. The recommended action is appraised in terms of two different
kinds of efficacy: (1) the likelihood that it will succeed in eliminating the
threat and (2) the subject’s own ability to carry out that action.
A typical experiment might manipulate these four variables, placing each
subject in as one of eight possible experimental conditions. A 1987 breast
cancer-based study186 is illustrative: college-age female subjects were first
182 See, e.g., Irving L. Janis, Effects of Fear Arousal on Attitude Change: Recent
Developments in Theory and Experimental Research, 3 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 166 (1967).
183 Kim Witte & Mike Allen, A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for
Effective Public Health Campaigns, 27 HEALTH ED. & BEHAV. 591, 593 (2000).
184 These have been dubbed parallel response or process models. For an early
example, see generally Howard Leventhal, Findings and Theory in the Study of Fear
Communications, 5 ADVANCES IN EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 119 (1970).
185 For a discussion of several frameworks that link emotional and cognitive/rational
factors to explain the operation of fear appeals, see Witte & Allen, supra note 183, at
593–95.
186 Patricia Rippetoe & Ronald W. Rogers, Effects of Components of
Protection-Motivation Theory on Adaptive and Maladaptive Coping With a Health
Threat, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 596 (1987).

315

THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 28:2 2013]

given either a high threat essay (coupling dramatic written and photographic
descriptions of cancer, as well as the side effects of radical chemotherapy or
mastectomy, with a focus on student susceptibility to the disease due to stress
and poor diets) or low threat essay (far less intense depictions of breast
cancer and its effects, subjects told that students rarely contract the
disease).187 In addition, the essay described either a high or low likelihood
that the desired response (breast self-examination) would be effective in
early cancer detection, and presented a high (breast exams are easy to do
correctly) or low (breast exams are difficult to do correctly, lumps are hard to
detect) self-efficacy message.188
After taking in this information, subjects were instructed to rate
themselves on several mood descriptors (frightened, tense, nervous, etc.) in
order to measure their fear arousal and to rate themselves on a continuum of
ways of coping with the threat of breast cancer, ranging from a declared
intention to conduct regular self-examinations, to an intention to learn more
about the disease and exams, to avoidance (“I try not to think about it”),
wishful thinking (“a miracle cure in the near future is the answer to my
fears”), prayer, and hopelessness (“it’s almost useless to try to stay
healthy”).189
Meta-analyses of these sorts of studies suggest that how subjects process
fear-inducing information tends to differ in cases of successful and
unsuccessful appeals. When a subject assesses the threat as low (because it is
not severe, she is not susceptible to it, or both), little fear is aroused and she
has little motivation to process the message further or to do anything in
response. Thus, low-threat fear appeals are not persuasive.190 But when the
subject’s perception of both components of the threat-vulnerability
combination is strong, she becomes motivated to do something to protect
herself.191
187 Id. at 599.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Since not all appeals of this nature produce fear, it has been suggested that they

be termed “threat appeals” in order to differentiate messages from their (potential)
effects. James Price Dillard, et al., The Multiple Affective Outcomes of AIDS PSAs: Fear
Appeals Do More Than Scare People, 23 COMM. RES. 44, 63 (1996).
191 For an explication of protection motivation theory, see Witte & Allen, supra note
183, at 594; Ronald W. Rogers, Cognitive and Physiological Processes in Fear Appeals
and Attitude Change: A Revised Theory of Protection Motivation, in BASIC SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 157, 157–60 (Cacioppo & Petty eds. 1983). For its origins,
see Ronald W. Rogers, A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appeals, 91 J. PSYCHOL.
93 (1975).
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What that something is depends on what she thinks about the
effectiveness of the recommended action. If she believes in the efficacy of
the recommended coping action (both generally and in terms of her own
ability to carry it out), the subject is likely to seek to avoid the threat (this is
called “danger control”) by carrying out the recommended action, i.e., she is
persuaded. But if she does not see herself as able to carry out a response that
will be effective, the subject is more likely to seek a means of coping with
her fear (“fear control”) through denial of the danger, avoidance of a
decision, suspicion/rejection of the source or other resistance.192
Fear appeals thus produce two reactions that can potentially conflict:
danger control and fear control. The research shows that the strength of
defensive fear control responses increases with increasing intensity of the
fear appeal and that they may have slightly stronger effects on the outcomes
of fear appeals than do subjects’ perceptions of the danger itself.193 Overall,
the literature tells us that appeals that generate the most fear can be the most
effective, so long as they convey both serious problems and strong, feasible
solutions.
It is important to point out certain limitations in this body of research.
First, the basis for much of what we know about fear appeals, at least in the
area of public health, comes from laboratory settings in which subjects are
provided hypothetical scenarios involving health risks and disease conditions
that may not directly affect them in their lifetimes and that they may not find
frightening. 194 In a good number of the public health experiments, the
subjects are relatively young and likely to see mortality and serious health
problems as quite remote. As a result, they are likely less susceptible than the
general population to fear arousal from any health threat. 195 From this
192 This response to fear appeals entailing two appraisals (of the threat and of the
coping action) with three possible outcomes (ignoring the message, controlling the
danger, controlling the fear) has been termed the extended parallel process model. Witte
& Allen, supra note 183, at 594; Kim Witte, Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals:
The Extended Parallel Process Model, 59 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 329, 337 (1992).
193 See Rippetoe & Rogers, supra note 186, at 601; Witte & Allen, supra note 183,
at 601 (noting negative correlation between danger control and fear control responses).
194 Some health-based fear studies involve fictitious diseases. See, e.g., Melissa C.
Brouwers & Richard M. Sorrentino, Uncertainty Orientation and Protection Motivation
Theory: the Role of Individual Differences in Health Compliance, 65 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 102 (1993).
195 Many studies are conducted with college students, but some employ even
younger subjects. See, e.g., Donna J. Fruin et al., Protection Motivation Theory and
Adolescents’ Perceptions of Exercise, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 55 (1991) (studying
the response of Australian high school sophomores and juniors to engaging in exercise to
avert cardiovascular disease).
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perspective, fear appeals in the “real world” may be more effective than
those measured by public health researchers.
On the other hand, results from these experiments may reflect an
artificially high level of attention and response paid to fear stimulus
messages. Unlike potential audiences for ordinary media advertising,
subjects in these experiments must ingest and respond to the fear appeal.
They have no option to turn off the television, ignore the billboard public
service announcement, or otherwise tune out (and, in the process, likely
reject) the message.196 This may skew the results in the opposite direction,
showing fear-inducing messages to be more effective in laboratory settings
than they are in certain real world settings.197
Furthermore, subjects in these experiments are commonly asked, in a
one-shot questionnaire, about their intention to adopt a recommended action
after being informed about the threat and response efficacy—a very different
measure than actual behavior change. Little is known about actual attitude or
behavior change in response to threat appeals. There is some empirical
evidence that respondents who report that they intend to change their
behavior often do not carry this through to actual conduct.198 Such findings
may raise some doubt about the lasting effects of fear appeals.

B. Mediation Applications and Questions
Much of the debate over persuasion in the mediation literature is based
on notions of autonomy: neutrals who seek to influence attitudes by
underscoring undesirable or even frightening alternative outcomes (usually
through legal evaluations) are said to be interfering with the parties’ exercise

196 See Dillard, et al., supra note 190, at 67–68.
197 There may also be culturally-based limitations on how far one can export such

threat appeal data. Subjects’ expectations and responses may be shaped in part by their
countries’ differing attitudes and practices regarding the use of threats (as opposed to
more supportive or empathic messages) in public safety or health ad campaigns. See
Gerard Hastings et al., Fear Appeals in Social Marketing: Strategic and Ethical Reasons
for Concern, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 961, 965 (2004).
198 William DeJong & Lawrence Wallack, A Critical Perspective on the Drug
Czar’s Antidrug Media Campaign, 4 J. HEALTH COMM. 155 (1999). On the other hand,
some studies show at least some promise of long term behavior change. See, e.g., Ronald
W. Rogers, et al., An Expectancy-Value Theory Approach to the Long-Term Modification
of Smoking Behavior, 34 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 562, 564 (1978) (concluding 19% of
smoker-subjects who reported intending to quit after receiving a persuasive high-threat
fear appeal were cigarette-free one year after the experiment).
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of informed, self-determined choice. 199 Put another way, resorting to
powerful emotional appeals is seen as having the potential to overwhelm
rational cognitive processes traditionally viewed as essential to autonomous
decision-making.
What may be significant in this research for mediators is that in addition
to evoking emotional reactions, successful fear appeals also appear to trigger
thinking, both about the threat and the subject’s ability to avert it. Indeed,
cause and effect are not clear from the research. Instead of being the stimulus
for a change in thinking, fear may be the product of the processing of
information about the severity and relevance of a threat.200 If this empirical
literature is to be credited, it would appear, first, that decisions (at least most)
people make in response to such persuasive efforts are not likely to be
overwhelmed by the fear aroused; and second, that however they operate,
effective fear appeals can sometimes act to neutralize defensive tendencies
such as anger, overconfidence, or denial that may be getting in the way of
logical thought. Viewed in this way, well-executed fear appeals, at least in
some cases, may actually work to enhance participant autonomy.
Applied to mediation, this research may point to the wisdom of
directness, if not bluntness, in describing the likelihood and severity of the
consequences of non-settlement options. Pulling punches or speaking in
shorthand in delivering such an evaluation or reality check may produce
insufficient belief in the seriousness of the threat to trigger real openness to
change.201 Moreover, if the perceived efficacy of a recommended action is
an essential determinant of whether a fear-arousing message is accepted,
merely stressing dangers—e.g.., the risks and noxious consequences of a trial
or other alternative to settling—without more, may not suffice. Embedded in
message resistance or avoidance may be a party’s belief that the opponent
will never agree to settle.202 Or (like so many smokers), a party may doubt
199 Compare, e.g., Lela Love, The Top Ten Reasons a Mediator Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 944–45 (1997) with Jacqueline Nolan-Haley,
Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999).
200 O’KEEFE, supra note 16, at 228.
201 This may raise a question about the efficacy of appeals that are aimed at creating
mere “doubt” or “uncertainty” in order to change the minds of mediation participants.
Such strategies are frequently endorsed in the mediation literature as effective in
producing movement from confidently-held positions. See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK,
supra note 5, at 246. To the extent that such interventions are motivated by a desire to
instill fear, this research suggests that they may fall short of their potential if they are too
indirect or ambiguous.
202 Experienced neutrals are familiar with parties who enter the process convinced
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his or her own ability to afford or sustain the commitments needed to resolve
the dispute. A successful effort to persuade by sowing doubt or fear may
therefore need to unpack the reasons for a party’s message resistance, give
the party reasonable assurance that the threat can be averted through conduct
taken in mediation, and provide at least general guidance as to what action
will produce a resolution.
It thus may follow that a negative evaluation may not be persuasive
unless relatively late in a mediation and only after a fair bit of caucusing, at
least in cases where the bargaining is adversarial and real settlement
parameters have been concealed.203 Once a mediator knows that one side
will likely accept a specific offer, it should be relatively easy to assure the
(fearful) opposing party that, by making that offer, she can put the threat
behind her.
Before drawing too many direct applications to the mediation setting,
however, a few additional caveats are in order. First, by focusing attention on
one emotion at a time, these sorts of studies may not replicate the more
complex realities of mediation. As mediation practitioners and others who
deal in conflict know (and as some studies illustrate204), strong messages can
often arouse multiple feelings, whose interaction may affect any response.
Thus, for example, if a fear appeal by a mediator were to trigger not only fear
but also anger (at the opponent, the mediator, the situation, or all three), the
efficacy of the persuasion effort might well be undermined by the party’s
desire to strike back in response to the anger aroused 205 or by general

(through earlier dealings, projection, or both) that the opponent will “never” be willing to
resolve the matter on any reasonable terms.
203 While the research is not clear on this point, some studies suggest that for a fear
appeal to be effective, the threat information should be transmitted before the
recommended action. See, e.g., James Price Dillard & Jason W. Anderson, The Role of
Fear in Persuasion, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 909, 914 (2004); but see, Howard
Leventhal & Robert Paul Singer, Affect Arousal and Positioning of Recommendations in
Persuasive Communications, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 137 (1966). If this
reasoning is correct, it might call into question the efficacy of some of the received
wisdom about the optimal (i.e., last resort) timing of fear-inducing evaluations in
mediation, at least to the extent that they come after other persuasive attempts to produce
the same recommended action. See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The
Highwire Act of Evaluation, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 62 (1996).
204 See Dillard et al., supra note 190, at 45.
205 The desire to fight or attack and reject seems to be the “action tendency”
associated with anger. See, e.g., James Price Dillard & Eugenia Peck, Persuasion and the
Structure of Affect, 27 HUMAN COMM. RES. 38 (2001) (discussing differing action
tendencies produced by different emotions); Dillard et al., supra note 190, at 50.
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message reactance. 206 At a minimum, this complicates matters for
practitioners, by forcing them to attempt to identify—and address
constructively—the varied emotions that may be contributing to a disputant’s
response to a persuasive message.
In addition, if, as studies suggest, fear appeals do not reliably produce
lasting change in attitudes and behaviors, what of settlements that require
long-term commitments, for example, a mother’s agreeing to increased and
regular child access for a father she hates? If her agreement to the settlement
was in any substantial measure a byproduct of fear, might the type of
persuasion used (as compared to others that were available) reduce her
willingness to abide by its terms over time? For many mediators concerned
with the stability of agreements reached with their assistance, this important
measure of the quality of message acceptance would be helpful to know.

C. Guilt Appeals
The use of guilt as a persuasive tool is commonly found in efforts to
induce greater volunteerism or charitable giving and to influence
consumer-purchasing decisions. By directly or indirectly confronting
audiences with discrepancies between their personal standards and their
actual conduct, guilt appeals seek to trigger unpleasant feelings that will
motivate people to seek relief by making amends for their self-perceived
shortcomings.

1. Direct Guilt Appeals
Efforts to persuade by capitalizing on guilt take several forms. The most
direct involves the presentation of a message which draws a subject’s
attention to the inconsistency of her (past or ongoing) behavior with her own
standards or ideals. Like fear appeals, guilt-based persuasive messages have
a “problem-solution” structure: (a) the guilt-inducing suggestion that the
recipient’s conduct or inaction violates her personal norms or some social or
206 The specter of arousing anger, sadness or other feelings as part of a fear appeal

raises another practice-oriented question for many mediators: What emotions are likely to
be aroused by (as is common in some difficult mediations) repeated references to the
non-settlement threats that a party faces? Might the fear component have a diminishing
impact over time if other feelings that are triggered strengthen? And would it be
problematic if those other feelings (e.g. sadness) led a subject to exhibit lethargy or
withdrawal in accepting the fear message? See Dillard et al., supra note 190, at 50;
Dillard & Peck, supra note 205, at 42, 59–60 (noting such action tendencies for sadness
but identifying this as an area of undeveloped understanding).
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moral principle, and (b) the recommended change in behavior that can make
up for the lapse and thus reduce the guilty feeling.
The extent of research in this area is rather limited as compared to
empirical work concerning fear appeals. The field’s one meta-analysis, based
on approximately thirty years of guilt studies,207 summarizes the research as
follows: as with fear appeals, more intense guilt messages arouse a greater
amount of emotional response. But unlike fear appeals, guilt appeals can go
too far: as guilt appeals become more intense or explicit, they become
dependably less persuasive.208
Illustrative of the experimental methodology in this area is a 1995 study
of advertisements aimed at encouraging working mothers’ purchase of dental
floss. 209 Subjects in the study were given information that included
statements that attempted to stimulate varying degrees of guilt: low
(“Keeping your child’s teeth clean and fresh . . . that is FLOSS-IT’s job!”),
medium (“You shape your child’s dental health, so don’t let your family
down.”) and high (“It’s YOUR responsibility to make sure that your kids have
healthy teeth and gums . . . don’t make any mistakes . . . DO IT RIGHT!”).210
Subjects were then asked to describe their own response to the ad by
reporting whether and how much they experienced fifteen emotions, ranging
from “happy” to “guilty” to “angry” (and twelve others).211
The results of this study showed, first, that the amount of guilt felt was
higher in response to moderate and high guilt appeals than to low intensity
messages; second, that as guilt content rose from moderate to more blatant,
such appeals generated anger and negative source attributions, (e.g., “The
company is trying to manipulate my attitudes and feelings,” “The company is
primarily concerned about making money.”); and third, that purchase intent
declined as guilt levels rose.212
Similar results have been reported in studies involving transgressions in
close or intimate personal relationships. While research in this area shows
that targets of their victims’ guilt-heaping messages report having learned a
207 See generally Daniel J. O’Keefe, Guilt and Social Influence, 23 COMM. Y.B. 67
(2000). Note the comparatively small size of this meta-analysis: it was based on nine
studies of guilt arousal involving 630 subjects and only five studies of the impact of guilt
message explicitness on persuasion, involving 323 participants.
208 Id. at 83.
209 Robin Higie Coulter & Mary Beth Pinto, Guilt Appeals in Advertising: What Are
Their Effects?, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 697, 699 (1995). In this study, felt guilt was
actually lower in the high guilt appeal than in the moderate version.
210 Id. at 700.
211 Id. at 701.
212 Id. at 701–703.
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lesson from such incidents and that feelings of guilt had an impact on their
subsequent behavior, such targets also report resenting this approach.213
Why do recipients resent guilt-based appeals and reject them as the
arousal of guilty feelings intensifies? The best explanation is that such
appeals (especially if they come from a third person) trigger psychological
reactance: messages are perceived as attacks on the self and as efforts to limit
one’s freedom, coming from sources (such as advertisers) not entitled to
criticize one’s conduct. 214 Resentment, anger, and a desire to lash out
against the message and the messenger are often the result.215

2. Hypocrisy Induction and Anticipated Guilt
Persuasion efforts seeking to trade on aroused guilt or on closely-linked
emotional states are not limited to direct appeals. Recent research into a
related area, hypocrisy induction, has revealed this device to be an effective
form of active self-persuasion. In a typical hypocrisy induction experiment,
subjects are asked to make a speech advocating a stance that embraces
“prosocial” ideals that they support (e.g., regular condom use, water
conservation, recycling) and then recall times in the past when they failed to
act in keeping with those standards. When surveyed, these subjects state
significantly greater intention to bring their future conduct in line with the
espoused ideals than do others who merely made a speech or were reminded
213 See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., Personal Narratives About Guilt: Role in

Action Control and Interpersonal Relationships, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCH. 173
(1995) (studying first person autobiographical narratives of guilt experiences). In another
study, subjects were shown a videotape depicting a person in need appealing to a
reluctant friend for help in the form of a ride to school or help on a math test. Requests
were either framed in terms of altruism (“Can we find a solution to this together?”) or
guilt (“If you don’t help me, you’re selfish.”). On being asked to enact the part of the
friend whose help was sought, subjects exposed to the guilt appeal reported, overall, a
lower likelihood of compliance with the request and greater reactance (more overt or
covert anger) and less liking of and respect for the friend than those in the altruism group.
See generally Jeffrey Rubin & Warren F. Shaffer, Some Interpersonal Effects of Imposing
Guilt Versus Eliciting Altruism, 31 COUNSELING & VALUES 190 (1987).
214 O’Keefe, supra note 207, at 84; Robin Higie Coulter, et al., Believe It or Not:
Persuasion, Manipulation and Credibility of Guilt Appeals, 26 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER
RES. 288, 292 (1999).
215 This may be especially true where subjects infer that the guilt-based message is
manipulative in intent, a perception that may be found especially in subjects who are
knowledgeable about persuasion tactics. See June Cotte, Robin A. Coulter & Melissa
Moore, Enhancing or Disrupting Guilt: The Role of Ad Credibility and Perceived
Manipulative Intent, 58 J. BUS. RES. 361 (2003).
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of the importance of, e.g., wearing condoms.216
In addition, (and perhaps especially useful in mediation) researchers have
begun to study the use of anticipated guilt as a persuasive device. In contrast
to the direct and indirect efforts to persuade by arousing feelings of guilt in
the moment, researchers have sought to measure the effects of causing
people to forecast how they will feel in the future if their current action or
inaction produces harmful effects, or causes them to fall short of their own
standards.
In an illustrative recent study, undergraduate student subjects were asked
to get tested to see if they could join the bone marrow donor registry during
National Bone Marrow Awareness Month.217 While all students were given
the same written description of the diseases for which bone marrow
transplants might be life-saving and of the simple procedure for getting
tested, the experiment varied the intensity of its anticipated guilt component.
One group was given a “naturalistic” appeal which underscored the
seriousness of the blood diseases that could be treated by donation and urged
subjects to join the donor registry, concluding: “You may save a life!”218
The rest of the subjects were given a high anticipated guilt message which
added brief stories about two children with leukemia—one who died for lack
of a transplant, the other flourishing after getting one—and a closing
exhortation to “think about how bad you might feel if you decided not to help
when it is so easy.”219
Compared to those who read the naturalistic appeal, students who read
the more intensive message reported a higher estimate of the guilt they would
feel if they failed to volunteer, and a higher level of intention to take the first
step to becoming a donor.220 Regardless of their level of intensity, these
216 E. Aronson, C. Fried & J. Stone, Overcoming Denial and Increasing the

Intention to Use Condoms Through the Induction of Hypocrisy, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1636, 1637 (1991). The persuasiveness of this approach has been explained on the basis
of dissonance aroused by revelation of one’s hypocrisy: the discrepancy between the
norms subjects espouse and their past behavior. In order to reduce dissonance, subjects
state their intention—and, in some cases, follow through with behaviors designed—to
bring their conduct in line with their beliefs. It has been asserted that these results can just
as readily be explained on the basis of guilt arousal and reduction. O’Keefe, supra note
207, at 87. See supra text accompanying note 38 for a discussion of role reversal and its
relationship to dissonance theory.
217 Lisa L. Massi Lindsey, Anticipated Guilt as Behavioral Motivation: An
Examination of Appeals to Help Unknown Others Through Bone Marrow Donation, 31
HUM. COMM. RES. 453, 460 (2005).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 461.
220 Id. at 463-64.
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messages were not met with reactance: subjects generally found nothing
objectionable about them.221 Such forecasted feelings may not withstand the
test of time, however: when surveyed a week or so later, students who had
taken no action toward becoming a donor reported feeling less actual guilt
than they anticipated they would.222

D. Mediation Questions and Applications
Guilt—at least if employed in the form of a direct message from the
neutral—would seem to be a potentially risky tool of persuasion in
mediation. As this research suggests, direct guilt appeals are unlikely to be
effective, and indeed may backfire, unless employed in small doses, with
delicacy and tact. Finding a level of intensity that arouses motivating guilt
but avoids psychological reactance may be difficult for mediators in most
real life circumstances. If guilt messages typically trigger resentment and
anger, even in personal relationships, the challenges for outsiders (like
mediators) to leverage such bad feelings would seem even more daunting.
And if that mediator has pledged to remain neutral and impartial, any
obvious “guilt trip” seems particularly likely to fail.223
Adding to these challenges for mediators is the fact that, for direct guilt
appeals to be effective, some discrepancy between a person’s standards and
conduct must be acknowledged. This would seem to rule out guilt appeals in
contested situations in which a party denies that his conduct was wrongful or
221 Id. at 470.
222 Id. at 471. A final way of using guilt to change behavior—known as the

transgression-compliance effect—has been tested in research in which experimenters
trigger an actual wrongful act on the part of a subject and then compare the extent to
which such subjects (as opposed to those who have not “transgressed”) comply with
subsequent requests for help. In a representative study, subjects ostensibly knocked down
and upset the ordering of another student’s stack of precisely organized computer cards
and then were asked to make helpful phone calls for the experimenter. See Paula
Konoske, et al., Compliant Reactions to Guilt: Self-Esteem or Self-Punishment, 108 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 207 (1979). In this and other such settings, those who transgress comply
with subsequent requests for help in significantly and predictably greater numbers than
those who are simply asked for help without having committed a “wrong.” The desire to
alleviate guilt that results from “real time” (even accidental) wrongdoing seems to be a
strong motivator, uncomplicated by the reactance that tends to accompany having one’s
behavioral lapses pointed out by others. The success of the “door-in-the-face” strategy
may be explained on this basis. See infra text accompanying notes 288–98.
223 In order to avoid reactance, mediators might attempt to arouse guilt through
questioning, rather than direct statements. But, as we have seen, this form of persuasion
has its own problems. See supra text accompanying notes 134–42.

325

THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 28:2 2013]

problematic to begin with. Moreover, in legal disputes, because of technical
defenses, legal responsibility may not ultimately attach to conduct for which
guilt might ordinarily be aroused. As a result, ordinary notions of
wrongdoing may become attenuated, and normal guilt feelings diluted or
eliminated.
Can other uses of guilt that hold more persuasive promise (at least in the
laboratory) be harnessed successfully by mediators? For example, can
hypocrisy be induced effectively by a mediator who anticipates a
participant’s extreme adversarial tactics? What of seeking early in the
process to gain a party’s explicit commitment—in the party’s own words, if
possible—to certain substantive or personal standards (e.g., “Can we agree
that in general children should have generous access to both parents
post-divorce?” “Am I correct that, as an owner with more than thirty years’
experience doing business in the community, you generally try to make your
customers’ experience a quality one?”) or process-oriented norms (“Can we
agree that today’s session will go better if everyone dispenses with extreme
statements or other excessive hardball in bargaining?”)—with an eye to
having that party repeat their commitments if they behave inconsistently later
in the mediation? Research supports the persuasive power of these kinds of
interventions.
Anticipated guilt appeals may also have direct application to mediation.
Urging disputants to consider how the consequences of failing to resolve a
matter could make them feel (“How will you feel about how you performed
your role as a dad if you turn down her offer, and continue to see your child
only one afternoon a month for the next seven or eight months until the judge
hears the case?” “Consider how it might feel if the company suffers a large
adverse verdict at trial and, since you’re uninsured, you have to lay off
several employees.”) would seem to hold the promise of considerable
persuasive potential. In laboratory settings involving prosocial activities such
as bone marrow donation, anticipated guilt appeals have not produced
reactance. Coming from a mediator, would the kinds of anticipated guilt
appeals we have described be as reactance-proof? This would be useful to
test.
Finally, as seems to be the case with the use of fear, there is a question as
to how long the persuasive effects of guilt appeals actually last. If this kind of
persuasion largely results from experiencing unpleasant emotions, it is
plausible that the effects of such influence may be ephemeral, weakening
over time. The same would hold true for the effects of successfully-induced
anticipated guilt, if, as the research suggests, people tend to overestimate
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their future levels of guilt.224 This might argue against the use of such
persuasive tactics in mediations where compliance with long-term
commitments is important.

E. Some Concluding Thoughts on Persuasion and “Negative
Emotions
Taken as a whole, the empirical research suggests that both fear and guilt
appeals, skillfully executed, have the capacity to be effective in changing
minds. But as noted earlier, this begs the normative question: Are such
“negative” emotional appeals an appropriate exercise in mediator
persuasion?225
As political scientist Drew Westin recently observed, “‘feelings’ are
millions of years older than the kind of conscious thought processes we call
‘reason,’ and they have been guiding behavior for far longer.”226 Mediation
is often a highly emotional process, in which the parties’ feelings hold strong
sway on their communication patterns and decision-making processes,
sometimes in ways that disserve them. When this occurs (whether they admit
it or not), mediators commonly invoke negative emotions in response. Those
who engage in any form of evaluation or reality testing, sowing doubt about
a disputant’s position or negotiating stance, do so knowing at some level that
this may produce anxiety, or even fear. Mediators who try to help parties
honestly confront their own past bad behavior and contributions to a dispute
understand that these interventions may bring feelings of regret, guilt and
shame. Certain role reversal interventions, such as asking a party to consider
how his or her actions may have affected or hurt the other side, can
foreseeably produce the same guilt-evoking effect. All such interventions
seem well within the mainstream of accepted mediator practice.
Why is this so? If one thinks closely about the so-called “negative”
emotions of fear and guilt, they are not really negative at all. Fear, of course,
is highly adaptive when it helps humans avoid risk or escape danger. And
while guilt is often derided in our culture, the ability to empathize with those
we hurt is at the root of conscience and is what enables us to act morally
towards one another. In the specific context of mediation, a healthy dose of
224 Lindsey, supra note 217, at 472.
225 While other sections of this article may also raise normative questions, we

address this issue here out of a sense that, for many mediation theorists and practitioners,
persuasion based on fear or guilt may be the most emblematic of the “ideological divide”
in the field.
226 DREW WESTIN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN 57 (2007).
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anxiety, induced by the mediator, may help disputants reconsider overly
confident decisions not in their long-term interest. A dollop of induced guilt
may help disputants come to terms more fully with the negative effects of
their behaviors on others, thereby developing greater objectivity about their
situation. So long as fear and guilt appeals are not exaggerated by the
mediator, both kinds of interventions can help disputants surface and
confront painful thoughts and feelings about which they may have been in
denial, and produce more fully considered decisions.227
Some mediators will resist this notion. Individuals might cite their own
lack of competence or training as the reason, but such prudential concerns
ought not be confused with normative claims about “proper” mediator
conduct. Nor should personal discomfort at the prospect of inflicting
unpleasant feelings on another person. 228 Regardless of how neutrals
ultimately resolve questions about the proper use of persuasion in the cases
they mediate, the empirical research on fear and guilt appeals ought at the
very least inform their decisions.

VII. GROUP BRAINSTORMING: PERSUASION BY EXPANDING OPTIONS?
BY INDUCING COOPERATION?
Despite your best efforts, the Halverson mediation has continued to be a
completely zero-sum, tug-of-war affair. Both parties have privately given
strong signals that they want to resolve the matter, but they have been unable
to bridge the monetary divide between them. You decide to make another
effort to broaden the discussion, by having the parties consider non-monetary
ways of resolving their dispute. (The defendants previously refused to
consider this; you have now persuaded them in caucus to give it a shot.)
Having prepared both sides for what will ensue, you bring them together in
joint session to try to identify together as many possible solutions to their
dispute as they can generate (involving money and not), and then to evaluate
them, based on their interests. Is this a good idea? Is it likely to work? In this
situation?
Group brainstorming is a mode of problem-solving used in several forms
of mediation today. Consistent with the trend in recent years by negotiation

227 Indeed, to the extent that fear or guilt appeals tap into and bring to the surface
preexisting emotions of the parties (as opposed to interposing the mediator’s views), such
interventions can be seen as exercises in self-persuasion and self-determination, rather
than direct persuasion by the mediator.
228 This has been termed “meta-guilt.” See Baumeister et al., supra note 213, at 176.
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scholars to advocate interest-based rather than positional bargaining, 229
some mediation texts and trainers endorse brainstorming as a preferred, or
even sole, method of negotiation.230 In some respects, this is not surprising.
Although not every dispute has integrative potential, 231 mediation
practitioners and scholars often tout the “value creating” aspects of the
process: its power to help disputants to think more broadly about their
interests and generate more creative, satisfying and optimal solutions to their
problems. Group brainstorming seems an ideal way to try to achieve such
outcomes.
Other scholars have emphasized the potential affective advantages of
face-to-face brainstorming: its capacity to reduce rigid thinking or build a
sense of group cohesion that enables participants to set aside their individual
interests and analyze a problem collectively.232 What do empirical studies
actually tell us about the efficacy of group brainstorming as a vehicle for
generating ideas, inducing cooperation and changing minds? Some of what
researchers have learned is surprising.

A. Direct Studies of Group Brainstorming
It has been more than fifty years since Alex Osborn first set out his
theory of group brainstorming as a creative way for organizations to solve
their problems.233 Based on its widespread use today, most people are at
least dimly aware of the recommended “rules” of the process: (1) at first,
ideas should be generated, without any criticism or self-censorship; (2) the
more ideas that can be generated, the better, including seemingly “wild” or
implausible ones; (3) once as many ideas as possible have been generated,
229 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1992); Carrie

Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). But see Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining
With a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limits of a Communitarian Conception of Legal
Dispute Bargaining, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2008).
230 See, e.g., BEER WITH STIEF, supra note 179; BENNETT & HUGHES, supra note 178
(each devoting one or two pages to distributive bargaining and multiple pages to
interest-based bargaining, eliciting interests and brainstorming). Similarly, a training
session on mediating attorney-client fee disputes that one of us recently attended taught
principles of brainstorming to the exclusion of all other processes a mediator might use to
orchestrate the parties’ bargaining.
231 See, e.g., Gerald Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L. J.
369 (1996).
232 See, e.g., FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 256–57.
233 See generally ALEX OSBORN, APPLIED IMAGINATION (1957).
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they can be evaluated; (4) ideas can then be combined, synthesized and
improved upon, to produce the best possible outcomes.
Since the publication of Osborn’s Applied Imagination, group
brainstorming has been the subject of a great deal of social science
experimentation. Studies generally proceed along the following lines: a
group of undergraduate or graduate students, who may or may not know each
other, are divided into small groups of four or five to try to brainstorm
possible solutions to a given problem—say, how to attract European tourists
to visit the U.S. in larger numbers,234 or what activities to arrange for
visiting high school students who are have been admitted to the university.235
Half the students are placed in so-called “nominal groups,” working alone to
generate ideas and then meeting to pool their ideas; the remaining students
work in face-to-face, interactive groups, generating ideas collectively.
Typically, subjects are provided some basic instruction on principles of
brainstorming; sometimes, a control group, receiving no training in
brainstorming, is added.236
The results of such experiments are consistent and clear: “individuals
who work alone and whose non-overlapping ideas are pooled . . . produce
more and better ideas than [the same number] of individuals who work in an
interactive group . . . Almost fifty years of brainstorming research has
consistently shown that, when it comes to productivity, idea generation might
best be left to individuals instead of groups.”237 Several meta-analyses have
strongly confirmed this finding, 238 one concluding that, compared to
nominal groups, the “productivity loss of [interactive] brainstorming groups
is highly significant and of strong magnitude.”239
234 This is the so-called “tourists problem,” which has been replicated in many

different studies. See Corinne Faure, Beyond Brainstorming: Effects of Different Group
Procedures on Selection of Ideas and Satisfaction with the Process, 38 J. CREATIVE
BEHAV. 13, 24 (2004).
235 Michael Kramer et al., The Impact of Brainstorming on Subsequent Group
Processes: Beyond Generating Ideas, 28 SMALL GROUP RES. 218–42 (1997).
236 Id., at 218–42.
237 Bernard A. Nijstad et al., The Illusion of Group Productivity: A Reduction of
Failures Explanation, 36 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 31 (2006).
238 See generally Michael Diehl & Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss in
Brainstorming Groups: Toward the Solution of a Riddle, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 497 (1987) (showing this effect in 18 of 22 studies); Brian Mullen et al.,
Productivity Loss in Brainstorming Groups: A Meta-analytic Integration, 12 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2 (1991); Michael Diehl & Wolfgang Stroebe, Productivity Loss
in Idea-Generating Groups: Tracking Down the Blocking Effect, 61 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 392 (1991).
239 Mullen et al., supra note 238, at 18. There is some evidence that these
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While most of the attention of researchers has been focused on the
comparative quantity of ideas generated by nominal and interactive groups,
some researchers have also attempted to investigate the quality of ideas
generated in different brainstorming formats. Idea “quality” has been defined
differently in different studies, to include creativity, effectiveness, and/or
practicability.240 However defined and operationalized, most studies have
shown that nominal groups produce better ideas than interactive ones.241
As significant as these findings are, they are subject to a number of
qualifications: First, until recently, brainstorming researchers have focused
their studies almost exclusively on the idea-generation stage of the process,
largely ignoring how groups actually sort through ideas and make decisions.
An assumption of the research seems to have been that the larger number of
ideas produced, the more likely that participants will be able to combine and
build on each other’s ideas, and the greater the probability of achieving an
effective solution.242 But in practice, groups may find it difficult to process a
large number of ideas effectively or make good decisions.243 Indeed, one of
the only studies of group decision-making concluded that groups untrained in
discrepancies are reduced as groups become smaller, and that there is no statistically
significant difference in idea generation between nominal and interactive brainstorming
dyads. See Nijstad et al., supra note 237, at 31.
240 Faure, supra note 234, at 15.
241 Id. at 15–16 (citatioins omitted). The reasons for this production loss have also
been subject to experimental study, and may include factors such as “evaluation
apprehension” (people are fearful of expressing themselves freely in groups and therefore
censor themselves); “social loafing” (some group members will work less hard when they
see others carrying the load) and “production-blocking” (group members cannot state
their ideas freely and without interruption, but must take turns). See, e.g., Nicole L. Oxley
et al., The Effects of Facilitators on the Performance of Brainstorming Groups, 11 J. SOC.
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 633, 634–35 (1996), citing sources. Evaluation apprehension
may affect different people differently. Empirical research demonstrates that individuals
who are self-confident and reasonably assertive do better in group brainstorming
activities than people who are not. See Thomas J. Bouchard, Training, Motivation, and
Personality as Determinants of the Effectiveness of Brainstorming Groups and
Individuals, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 324, 330–31 (1972); L. Mabel Camacho & Paul B.
Paulus, The Role of Social Anxiousness in Group Brainstorming, 68 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1071, 1078–79 (1995).
242 Kramer et al., supra note 235, at 219. But see Nicholas W. Kohn et al., Building
on the Ideas of Others: An Examination of the Idea Combination Process, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 554, 560 (2011) (recent study finding that brainstorming
groups generally benefit for combining their own and others’ ideas, whether generated
individually or in groups, and calling for more study in this area).
243 Paul B. Paulus, Groups, Teams, and Creativity: The Creative Potential of
Idea-Generating Groups, 49 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: AN INT’L. REV. 237, 261–62 (2000).
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the basics of brainstorming made decisions that are just as good as those
made by nominal or interactive brainstorming groups with such training.244
Second, most brainstorming research does not involve the use of trained
facilitators to lead and orchestrate the brainstorming process. Does the
presence of a facilitator reduce production losses associated with interactive
brainstorming? The evidence is limited and mixed. One study245 concluded
yes, but only when the facilitators were “highly trained” (one-hour training,
followed by role play, followed by an additional two-hour training with
opportunities to listen to a recording of the role play and study a written
transcript of it). When facilitators who had received only an hour of basic
training led face-to-face brainstorming groups, these groups trailed nominal
groups not assisted by a facilitator in generating ideas, by a wide margin.246
Third, almost all of the brainstorming studies have examined idea
generation in groups of four or five people. There is some evidence that the
idea generation advantage enjoyed by nominal over face-to-face
brainstorming groups is reduced as the latter groups become smaller. One
meta-analytic study concludes that there is no statistically significant
difference in idea generation between nominal and interactive brainstorming
groups of two.247
Fourth, the cohesiveness or lack of cohesiveness of the group appears to
have a substantial effect on productivity in the brainstorming process. In one
early study, a researcher found that cohesive brainstorming groups (defined
as groups in which people were permitted to choose their own partners, based
on perceptions of their potential brainstorming ability) produced a
significantly greater number of ideas and more unique ideas than either
nominal groups or non-cohesive groups, at least when dealing with projects
they cared about.248 Subsequent research has shown that interpersonal and
task conflicts within a group interfere substantially with cognitive flexibility

244 Id. at 263–64.
245 Oxley et al., supra note 241, at 644.
246 Id. at 644–45. Compare Anne K. Offner et al., The Effects of Facilitation,

Recording, and Pauses on Group Brainstorming, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 283, 294 (1996)
(finding that facilitated brainstorming groups did about as well as nominal groups in idea
production), with Gerald P. Fleming, The Effects of Brainstorming on Subsequent
Problem Solving 96–97 (2000) (unpublished dissertation, St. Louis University) (finding
that facilitated brainstorming groups generated fewer ideas than either nominal groups or
un-facilitated brainstorming groups), on file with authors.
247 See Nijstad et al., supra note 237, at 31.
248 David Cohen, et al., Effect of Group Cohesiveness and Training Upon Creative
Thinking, 44 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 319, 321–22 (1960).
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and creative thinking, especially as the conflicts become more severe.249
Fifth, and perhaps most important for our purposes, despite the fact that
group brainstorming may seem less effective as a method of generating ideas
than one would expect, studies suggest that most people enjoy the process,
believe it to be effective, and are more satisfied with their own performance
than when working as individuals.250 These findings may help explain why
brainstorming remains popular: most people apparently believe that the
process has positive consequences, beyond merely generating ideas, in
building group cohesion and increasing commitment to decisions that are
made.251
Unfortunately, the impact of brainstorming in building group cohesion
has received much less focused attention by researchers than the study of
idea generation. It may therefore be useful to look at the broader empirical
literature on cooperation and competition for indirect clues as to whether and
how face-to-face brainstorming can reduce conflict and generate attitude
change.

B. Empirical Studies of Induced Cooperation
A useful starting point is the “Robbers Cave” experiment, a rigorously
designed field study of induced competition and cooperation, and their
effects on intergroup relations, that has become a classic in its field.252 In
this study, twenty-four eleven-year-old boys from the same city—from
similar religious and middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds, but strangers
to one another—were sent to a sleep-away camp in Oklahoma. They were
249 Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Laurie R. Weingart, Task Versus Relationship Conflict,
Team Performance, and Team Member Satisfaction: A Meta-Analysis, 88 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 741, 746 (2003) (meta-analytic findings challenging commonly held view that
task conflict is generally helpful in group process, but relational conflict is not).
250 See, e.g., Nijstad et al., supra note 237, at 45–47; Paul B. Paulus et al.,
Perception of Performance in Group Brainstorming: The Illusion of Group Productivity,
19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 78, 79, 86–87 (1993 ); Fleming, supra note
246, at 90–92.
251 Faure, supra note 234, at 13. See also, Kramer et al., supra note 235; Paul
Paulus, et al., Performance and Perceptions of Brainstormers in an Organizational
Setting, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 249 (1995). One study suggests, however,
that both task and relational conflict (but especially relational conflict) interfere with
participant satisfaction with brainstorming processes. De Dreu & Weingart, supra note
249, at 744–45.
252 MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THE
ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT (University of Oklahoma, 1961).
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divided into two sub-groups, and the study consisted of three stages. In Stage
One, over a period of 5–6 days, the sub-groups were each allowed to form
their own identities, relationships and hierarchies, without knowledge of the
existence of the second sub-group.253
In Stage Two, conducted over a period of the next 4–6 days, the
sub-groups were engaged in a series of closely contested competitive games
and activities (baseball and touch football games, tug of war and
tent-pitching contest, culminating in a treasure hunt), with trophies and
attractive prizes awarded only to the winning team. These were designed to
produce, and did produce, considerable intergroup friction and heightened
in-group solidarity and out-group stereotyping, consistent with one of the
hypotheses of the study designers.254
Stage Three followed immediately after the Stage Two competition and
consisted of two separate sub-parts. In the first part, campers were allowed to
have neutral contact with one another, engaging in activities like eating
meals, seeing a movie or going to the beach together. As hypothesized, mere
contact alone was not sufficient to reduce observed intergroup segregation,
tensions, and stereotyping. Instead, it led to further acts of hostility and
invective.255
In the second part of Stage Three, the boys were given a series of
activities involving mutually interdependent or “superordinate” goals—goals
of high value to both groups, but not achievable by either acting alone. These
activities—which included working to resolve a (manufactured) water
shortage, figuring out how to share expenses to rent a movie (“Treasure
Island”) that neither group could afford alone, and working together to jump
start a “stalled” truck—all required intergroup cooperation and coordination
of effort. Consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, the induced cooperation
during Stage Three succeeded in reducing “in group vs. out group”
behaviors— although the authors are careful to describe how this happened
very gradually, not immediately, resulting from a series of planned, mutually
interdependent activities.256
Over the years, the findings of the Robbers Cave study on the effects of
253 Id. at 74–95.
254 Id. at 96–150.
255 Id. at 158–59.
256 Id. at 210. In designing the study, the authors note that they rejected the use of

messages designed to correct group stereotypes because of the “large body of research
showing that discrete information, unrelated to the central concerns of the group, is
relatively ineffective in changing attitudes. Stereotypes crystalized during the eventful
course of competition and conflict . . . are usually more real in the experience of group
members than bits of information handed down to them.” Id. at 202.
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competition and cooperation on attitudes and behaviors have been replicated
and extended in scores of other experiments, involving both homogeneous
and heterogeneous groups, with some directly involving the negotiation
process.257 In general, when compared to a state of competition, cooperation
has been shown by experimental studies to be associated with such effects as:
(a) more effective communication in groups (more ideas verbalized,
participants more attentive to and accepting of other people’s views); (b)
more friendliness and greater satisfaction with group processes; (c) better
coordination of effort and orientation to task achievement; (d) reduced
polarity (less focus on differences, greater focus on similarities and
commonalities of viewpoints); (e) increased ability to engage in flexible
thinking and to find creative solutions; and (f) reduced egocentrism and
increased ability to take the perspective of others.258
As useful as these findings may be, much of the evidence for the benefits
of cooperation in the context of negotiation has been provided by research
utilizing prisoner’s dilemma or other similar two-person laboratory games,259
in which payout matrices are designed to produce competitive or cooperative
behavior. In an early experiment, for example, Morton Deutsch divided
M.I.T. undergraduates into problem-solving groups in which students were
either graded competitively (“the student producing the best ideas gets an A,
the second best student gets a B”) or cooperatively (“the group producing the
best ideas gets an A, the group producing the second best ideas gets a B”).260
While later studies experiment with more complex and varied reward or
257 Morton Deutsch, Cooperation and Conflict Resolution: Implications for
Consulting Psychology, 53 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J. PRAC. & RES. 76, 77 (Spring 2001)
(defining cooperation as involving “positive interdependence”—a state in which people’s
goals are positively linked with each other in such a way that they “sink or swim
together.”) By contrast, competition is a state of “negative interdependence,” in which
one person’s gain is another person’s loss: if one swims, the other sinks, and vice versa.
258 Id. at 78; see also MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 25–31
(1973) (collecting early studies); DAVID W. JOHNSON & ROGER T. JOHNSON,
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: THEORY AND RESEARCH, 100–101 (1989) (collecting
later studies); Charles M. Judd, Cognitive Effects of Attitude Conflict Resolution, 22 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 483, 495 (1978) (competition, cooperation and perceptions of
similarity ); Peter J. Carnevale and Tahira M. Probst, Social Values and Social Conflict in
Creative Problem Solving and Categorization, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1300, 1301–02 (1998) (effects of expectation of conflict on categorization and
perceptions of similarity); Susan M. Worley & Andrew I. Schwebel, The Effect of
Cooperation on Egocentrism in Divorce Mediation: A Simulation Study, 8 J. DIVORCE
151, 161 (1985).
259 DEUTSCH supra note 258, at 314–47.
260 Id. at 25–26.
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payout matrices,261 all suffer from a degree of artificiality.

C. Targeted Race Relation Studies and Other Studies of Individual
Prejudice
Researchers have also extensively examined the role of intergroup
contact and cooperation in reducing race, ethnic, and other forms of prejudice
between heterogeneous groups. Results of early studies were mixed, with
reductions of prejudice found in many studies, 262 but exacerbation of
intergroup tensions found in some others.263
Such studies may seem far afield from the world of disputing over legal
claims or tangible harms. But as one scholar has noted, “[a]rguably the
attitudes and behavior most difficult to change through rational argument are
those having to do with ethnic and racial prejudice, because there is a strong
emotional component to [them].”264 If induced cooperation can work to
reduce racial, ethnic and other forms of bias, might it have a similar effect in
lowering animosities between angry, emotional parties in garden variety
disputes?
In his classic work, The Nature of Prejudice, G.W. Allport proposed the
contact hypothesis–the idea that social contact between majority and
minority group members would lead to a reduction of bias when the contact
situation afforded participants equal status and the opportunity to work on
mutually interdependent goals.265 Social psychologists have been testing and
refining this hypothesis ever since. Conceptualizations vary, but researchers
have generally hypothesized that intergroup contact may not, by itself, be
sufficient to produce changes in negative stereotypes. Rather, to reduce bias,
the contact should be structured so that participants have equal status, share
261 See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997).
262 See, e.g., DANIEL M. WILNER, ET AL., HUMAN RELATIONS IN INTERRACIAL
HOUSING: A STUDY OF THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 147 (1955); Morton Deutsch & Mary
Evans Collins, Interracial Housing: Influence of Integrated, Segregated Housing on
Racial Attitudes Measured, 7 J. HOUSING 127, 134 (1950); Henry A. Singer, The Veteran
and Race Relations, 21 J. EDU. SOC. 397, 404–05 (1948).
263 Yehuda Amir, The Role of Intergroup Contact in Change of Prejudice and Race
Relations, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 245-308 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976).
264 Aronson, supra note 22, at 879.
265 Donna M. Desforges, et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on
Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531 (1991). See also, John Dovidio, et al., Intergroup Contact: The
Past, Present and the Future, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 5, 5 (2003).
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mutual goals, and have the opportunity actively to cooperate with one
another. Ideally, interactions should also afford participants the opportunity
to get to know one another, with information exchanged of a type to
disconfirm negative stereotypes.266
A vivid example of this theory in action involves “jigsaw learning.” The
author of several early field studies later described the impact of this
cooperative learning process on student attitudes in the Austin public school
system in 1971, soon after it was desegregated. Believing that classroom
competition might be exacerbating longstanding racial and ethnic tensions,
the authors placed students in small, culturally diverse, interdependent
learning groups. Illustrative was a lesson in which students had to teach each
other about portions of a biography of Eleanor Roosevelt in order to do well
on a scheduled exam. One Mexican-American student in one of these groups
(“Carlos”) had been derided by his classmates as stupid, and had learned over
the years to keep quiet in order to avoid being ridiculed. The authors describe
the effects of reinforcing cooperative learning behavior as follows:
When thrown on their own resources, the children eventually learned to
teach and to listen to one another . . . The word “eventually” is crucial.
Cooperative behavior doesn’t happen all at once . . . After a few days… it
began to dawn on the students in Carlos’s group that the only way they
could learn Carlos’s paragraph was by paying attention to what he had to
say. Moreover, they began to develop into pretty good interviewers . . .
Carlos began to respond to this treatment by becoming more relaxed . . .
The other children started to see things in him they had never seen before.
They concluded that Carlos was a lot smarter than they had previously
thought. For his part, Carlos began to enjoy school more and began to see
the Anglo students in his group not as tormentors but as helpful and
responsible people . . . [A]s he began to feel increasingly comfortable in
class and started to gain more confidence in himself, his academic
performance improved. The vicious cycle had been reversed . . .267

Allport’s contact theory has generated extensive study over the past fifty
years, with scholars more recently looking beyond race and ethnicity
relations to examine the effects of intergroup contact and cooperation on
attitudes toward other stigmatized groups. In general, they have found that
structured, cooperative contact produced generalizable improvements in
attitudes of members of “in-groups” toward members of “out-groups.”268
266 Desforges, et al., supra note 265, at 531–32.
267 Aronson, supra note 22, at 879–81 (citations omitted).
268 See, e.g., Donna M. Desforges, et al., supra note 254, at 540–42 (persons with
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Not all studies have produced such positive results, however. In real
world settings involving groups with some history of conflict, creating
conditions of mutual interdependence has not always led to friendlier and
less biased attitudes. 269 Efforts to reduce or eradicate status differences
among such groups or individuals have not always been successful.270 When
a cooperating group fails to accomplish a joint task, their cooperative efforts
can nevertheless increase intergroup attraction but only when the groups
have a history of cooperation.271 When groups have competed in the past,
failure in a joint endeavor has been shown to result in decreased attraction
between the groups.272
One recent meta-analytic review, analyzing 515 previous studies
involving more than 250,000 subjects, concludes that all other things being
equal, mere exposure between different groups does promote greater
intergroup liking and prejudice reduction, whether or not Allport’s optimal
conditions are met.273 There is an inverse association between intergroup
contact and prejudice, for all studies.274 However, taken together, it was
found that Allport’s structured conditions produce significantly greater
reduction of prejudice than mere exposure alone.275
mental illness); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The Effects of Intergroup
Cooperation and Intergroup Competition on Ingroup and Outgroup Cross-Handicap
Relationships, 124 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 85, 92–93 (1984) (learning disabled and emotionally
disturbed children); Christiana Vonofakou, et al., Contact With Outgroup Friends as a
Predictor of Meta-Attitudinal Strength and Accessibility of Attitudes Toward Gay Men, 92
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 804, 816 (2007).
269 Jean-Claude Deschamps and Rupert Brown, Superordinate Goals and Intergroup
Conflict, 22 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 194 (1983) (citing several studies of
labor-management relations).
270 See Elizabeth G. Cohen & Susan S. Roper, Modification of Interracial
Interaction Disability: An Application of Status Characteristic Theory, 37 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 643, 654 (1972); Irwin Katz, et al., Behavior and Productivity in
Biracial Work Groups, 11 HUM. REL. 123, 137 (1958).
271 Stephen Worchell, et al., Intergroup Cooperation and Intergroup Attraction: The
Effect of Previous Interaction and Outcome of Combined Effort, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 131, 138–39 (1977).
272 Id. at 139.
273 Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 765–66 (2006).
274 Id. at 766. The authors report that the effect size is “small to medium,” but
because of the very large sample size, the results are highly statistically significant. The
more rigorous the individual study, the greater the effect measured.
275 Id. (citations omitted). Interestingly, the authors were unable to isolate any
specific condition as being most important in enhancing prejudice reduction; none were
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D. Psychological Processes Explaining the Benefits of Induced

Cooperation
What are the processes by which cooperative, equal-status intergroup
contact improves communication, reduces prejudice and produces other
beneficial effects? In a world with scarce resources, it has been suggested,
people tend to view their relations with other groups as inherently
competitive. Perceptually, when people are placed into groups, actual
differences between members of their own in-group tend to be minimized
and differences with out-groups tend to become exaggerated and
over-generalized. For most people, this is anxiety-producing. Cooperative,
mutually interdependent activities promote a sense of each participating
person as an individual, rather than as a member of a group. They inculcate a
feeling of “we-ness” rather than “us versus them-ness,” resulting in reduced
intergroup anxiety and an increased ability to engage in mutual
perspective-taking.276
Cognitive dissonance may also play a role. Writing many years later
about his early studies demonstrating the positive effects of integrated
housing on racial attitudes, for example, Morton Deutsch noted:
[The] findings suggested that behavior change preceded attitudinal
change: The white women in the integrated projects often behaved in an
unprejudiced manner toward their Negro neighbors before they felt this
way. Had we been clever enough to realize the general implications of this
finding we might have anticipated the major idea underlying Festinger’s
theory of cognitive dissonance. . . . Namely, people tend to make their
beliefs and attitudes accord with their actions.277

found to play a special role.
276 See generally John Dovidio, et al., Cooperation, Common Identity, and
Intergroup Contact, in COOPERATION: THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EFFECTIVE
HUMAN INTERACTION 143 (Brandon A. Sullivan, et al., eds., 2008); Thomas F. Pettigrew
& Linda R. Tropp, How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-analytic Tests
of Three Mediators, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 922, 929 (2008) (meta-analysis of 515
studies). Reduced anxiety also may be linked to more positive moods, which themselves
have been shown to increase people’s ability to think creatively and inclusively. See, e.g.,
Alice M. Isen & Kimberly A Daubman, The Influence of Affect on Categorization, 47 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1206, 1217 (1984); Alice M. Isen, et al., Positive Affect
Facilitates Creative Problem Solving, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1122, 1129
(1987).
277 Morton Deutsch, Socially Relevant Science: Reflections on Some Studies of
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Whatever the precise psychological mechanisms at work, however,
induced cooperation works (like role reversal) as a form of self-persuasion:
[N]o direct attempt is made to convince anyone of anything. Rather,
individuals find themselves in a circumstance where it becomes efficacious
to convince themselves that a particular thing is the case: for example, that a
particular group they have joined is attractive . . . that members of a
minority group are not inferior, and so on . . . [T]hey become motivated to
engage in self-persuasion . . . a more powerful form of persuasion . . . than
more traditional persuasion . . . because in direct persuasion, the audience is
constantly aware of the fact that they have been persuaded by another.
Where self-persuasion occurs, people are convinced that the motivation for
change has come from within.278

E. Mediation Applications and Questions
What conclusions can we draw about group brainstorming as a mode of
persuasion in mediation from these diverse strands of scholarship, with their
gaps and inconsistencies? The process seems to hold great promise in some
cases but is also risky, and certainly is not appropriate for every dispute.
First, with regard to idea generation, the research evidence is equivocal
as to whether face-to-face brainstorming produces more ideas—in the
mediation context, more options for resolution—than other available formats.
Many variables will affect this calculus in a mediation, including the number
of people at the table, the depth of training of the neutral in brainstorming
facilitation techniques, the self-confidence of the parties, and their ability to
articulate ideas in a quasi-public forum. In the real world of mediation, the
number of brainstorming ideas generated may be limited by the reluctance or
unwillingness of negotiators to articulate any alternative outcomes to the
ones they strongly prefer. And of course, some negotiated disputes are truly
zero-sum matters or cases involving structural barriers that severely limit the
options that can be considered.
Second, even if conducting a mediation brainstorming process does
produce more options for resolution, there appears to be limited research
evidence that having more options to consider necessarily leads to more, or
better, agreements. This is not to say that expanding resolution options
doesn’t aid in resolving disputes, only that this has been mostly presumed,
and needs more empirical investigation.
Can a process of face-to-face brainstorming build a sense of group
Interpersonal Conflict, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1076, 1080 (1969).
278 Aronson, supra note 22, at 882.
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identity in a difficult mediation, causing participants to set aside (even
temporarily) their individual interests and analyze a problem more as a
“team”? We have observed this happen in practice and believe it to be true.
Nonetheless, it is clearly a substantial leap from creative brainstorming in
corporate departmental meetings or cooperative elementary school jigsaw
learning teams, to the highly strategic, often emotional world of competitive
negotiation. The parties in a mediated dispute are in a state of mutual,
cooperative interdependence only to the extent that they prefer some (but not
necessarily the same) negotiated agreement over their current options.
Neutrals often have very limited time in which to try to build an atmosphere
of cooperation through brainstorming efforts. Status, power, or ability
differences between the parties may be difficult to eradicate, notwithstanding
any general team-building effects of a brainstorming process. And if
brainstorming is attempted in mediation and fails, it may exacerbate
inter-party tensions, not reduce them.
On the other hand, orchestrating a face-to-face brainstorming process
may offer hope of reducing the demonization and rigid thinking that often
accompanies high conflict disputes. 279 Research involving identity-based
bias or prejudice, which are factors in only a small fraction of all mediated
cases, may seem to have little general relevance for the mediation process.
But rigid, categorical thinking and hostile attributions are a common
phenomenon in even the most routine mediations (e.g., in a landlord-tenant
dispute over a $500 security deposit, “what else would you expect from a
slum lord like him?”). The research on bias reduction suggests that inducing
the parties to cooperate through face-to-face brainstorming may help the
parties see each other more as individuals and less as “types.” And because
of the self-persuading nature of successful brainstorming, a resolution
reached through such a process is likely to be a durable one.
If a neutral decides to try to orchestrate a brainstorming process, when
during the process should she do so, to enhance its chances of success? One
of the abiding lessons of studies on induced cooperation and other forms of
self-persuasion is that they take time and lead to gradual change. This
suggests that if brainstorming is going to be attempted at all, it should be
initiated relatively early in the process, at a point when there is considerable
time remaining. As we have noted elsewhere, however, mediators are
well-advised not to try to resolve the issues facing them prematurely, before
the information base of the dispute has been fully developed, the disputants
have had a chance to say fully what is on their minds, and have experienced
279 See, e.g., LOUIS KRIESBERG, SOCIAL CONFLICTS 69–72 (Neil Smelser 2d. ed.,

1982).
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some emotional “letting go” of the conflict. 280 This suggests that
brainstorming, like any negotiating process, should be postponed until the
later stages of the mediation. This is especially the case in competitive
negotiations—perhaps particularly those involving lawyers—in which the
process must allow sufficient time for the bargaining to traverse its various
strategic stages and ritualized “dance” of gradual concessions.281 In our
experience, many hard boiled negotiators will not even consider agreeing to a
process like brainstorming unless their competitive strategies have clearly led
to impasse, and only then late in the game (if at all).
Can a late stage, impasse-breaking brainstorming process be effective in
producing greater group cohesion and attitude change? Can hard-nosed
competitors “turn on a dime”? The story of Carlos and his classmates is
perhaps instructive in demonstrating how the approach of deadlines can help
turn a competitive enterprise into a more cooperative one in short order. At
the end of a hotly contested mediation, with a deadline looming, the mediator
may be able to impress on the parties the mutual risks and costs of not
“getting the job done.”
But much of this, of course, is conjecture. Most neutrals intuitively
understand the value of cooperation and try to inculcate it in their mediations,
for example by developing a mutual set of ground rules for the process or,
later, a jointly created agenda of topics to be explored and issues to be
negotiated. As we have seen, a good deal of empirical work has been done
demonstrating the value of induced cooperation in improving intergroup
relations generally and the negotiation process in particular. But we have no
direct empirical evidence measuring the impact of brainstorming in
mediation in inducing inter-party cooperation. This would seem to be a
fertile area for future study.

VIII. PRODUCING MOVEMENT: THE POWER OF SEQUENTIAL REQUESTS
Assume that your brainstorming efforts in the Halverson case were
unsuccessful. The defendants were willing to consider the possibility of
part-time, contractual work for the complainant at some time in the
(unspecified) future but not the kind of immediate full-time work that she
280 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 126–27. On the emotional stages that

disputants frequently must traverse before they are ready to resolve a conflict, see, e.g.,
Louis Kriesberg, Timing and the Initiation of De-Escalation Moves, in J. WILLIAM
BRESLIN & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, EDS., NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 223–24 (J.
WIlliam Breslin & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., 1991); Gerald Williams, Negotiation as a
Healing Process, 1996 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 1, 42–56 (1996).
281 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 5, at 127.
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was demanding. Negotiating the language of a positive job reference was not
enough to bridge the gaps between the parties. You have now spent more
than five hours in mediation and it is clear that both sides are running out of
patience.
The company has put an offer of $27,500 on the table; that offer was
quickly rejected by plaintiff’s counsel. Given their voluntary presence at the
table and their acknowledgment of certain risks they face, however, you are
certain that the employer is prepared to go higher, although how high is
unclear, given the fairly early stage of the dispute and the risks that the
plaintiff also faces.
After another caucus, the plaintiff has stated that, if necessary, she will
accept a figure of $42,500 to end the matter today—but not a penny less.
Based on your extended conversations, you believe her. You calculate that
enough time remains for two quick rounds of caucuses. In thinking about
how you might persuade the company’s representatives to consider offering
$42,500, three possible strategies come to mind:
(A) Ask for a smaller amount that you are reasonably sure they would
move to, say $35,000, and, once they say yes, ask them to tell you, in
confidence, whether—if necessary—they would go to $42,500 if that would
end the matter;
(B) Ask for a higher figure—one that you are reasonably sure they would
reject—say $55,000, and then ask for the $42,500;
(C) Ask for $42,500.
You wonder: Which of these is likely to be the most effective?282
Experimental research suggests that as between approaches A and B, it
may not matter. Either of those approaches is more likely to produce the
target result than the direct approach, C.
Sequential—as compared to straightforward—requests to gain agreement
to a target goal have been the subject of study for more than four decades.
The two best-known approaches have been termed “foot-in-the-door” and
“door-in-the-face.” The foot-in-the-door strategy involves starting with a
small, very likely-to-be-accepted request, followed (once accepted) by a
larger (target) one. Door-in-the-face approaches use a mirror opposite
technique: starting with a large, very likely-to-be-refused request, followed
282 Needless to say, at any given point a wide variety of psychological and strategic
factors might influence the defense’s response to settlement figures suggested by the
mediator. These might include their reactions to the plaintiff’s pattern of concessions, the
degree of trust they have in the mediator, the impact of time scarcity on their willingness
to make a next move that could settle the case today, and their calculation of the chances
of settling the case favorably later, after they allow the mediation to end in an (apparent)
impasse.
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by a more moderate (target) one. In experimental settings, both approaches
have been shown to be dependably more effective than direct requests in
inducing compliance with the target.
For many students of negotiation, this conclusion may seem
unremarkable, resonating with their experience, intuition and much else that
has been written about effective bargaining.283 But empirical research into
these two phenomena tells us more. The conditions under which these
approaches work best and the cognitive and affective explanations for their
success may offer helpful insights into how persuasive efforts in mediation
might best be carried out. Let us take these sequential compliance-seeking
tactics one at a time.

A. Foot-in-the-Door (FITD)
The name given to this compliance technique conjures up images of a
traveling salesman trying to gain entry into someone’s home in order to have
a chance to make a sale. In fact, the conditions under which this strategy has
been shown to work are typified by early experiments which involved
entering subjects’ homes. Experimental research demonstrates that getting
someone to agree to a small initial request increases the likelihood that he or
she will comply with a second, larger one.
In one early representative study, researchers first phoned Palo Alto
housewives and asked (and got) them to take a few minutes to answer a few
questions about soaps they used. Three days later, the researchers called the
women again to ask whether they would allow a team of five or six men
access to their homes’ kitchen and other storage areas for a two-hour survey
of their household products. These women agreed to the two-hour request at
over twice the rate of another (control) group of women who had only been
283 For example, the foot-in-the-door approach would appear to involve the

commitment and consistency principle, which states that people, having made a
commitment to act in one way, generally wish to be seen as acting consistently. CIALDINI,
supra note 16, at 57–67. The tactic is also consistent with standard competitive
bargaining behavior: By getting to the target in steps rather than all at once, a party
avoids the risk of overpaying by making two moves without a reciprocal response from
the opposing side. The efficacy of the door-in-the face approach might be seen as
reflecting the power of anchoring: The second, smaller request always appears more
reasonable when compared to the size of the first. NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 35, at
48–49. Door-in-the-face also can be seen as demonstrating the reciprocity norm in action,
with the second, smaller request by the requester seen as a “concession” from the first,
larger one, warranting a corresponding concession by the subject. CIALDINI, supra note
16, at 17–21.
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asked for the two-hour home inspection.284
In another study, the same researchers first asked one group of California
housewives to either display a small window sign or to sign a petition in
support of either safe driving or keeping California beautiful. Two weeks
later, these subjects—and a control group of whom no prior requests had
been made—were asked (by a different requester) to agree to a larger
(“target”) undertaking: allowing a large, unattractive “Drive Carefully”
billboard to be installed on their front lawn for a week. The group that had
earlier agreed to post the window sign or sign the petition complied with the
second request at more than twice the rate (55%) of the control group
members (20%).285
The effectiveness of foot-in-the-door in increasing compliance with the
larger “target” request (as compared to straightforward target requests only)
has been explained on the basis of changed self-perception: as a result of
having agreed to the initial request, the subject sees herself as one who is
cooperative, helps good causes and strangers. That inference, in turn, propels
the subject to act consistently, agreeing to the second, larger request. Where
the first request is made in the presence of a reward, threat, or other external
justification, agreeing to that request is less likely to be attributed by the
subject to his or her own internal motivations; as a result, the sequential
strategy is less likely to work in such situations. 286 Given this
explanation,287 it should not be surprising that the success of FITD strategy
increases with the size of the agreed-to initial request 288 (the more
significant the first act of volunteerism, the greater the sense of being
284 Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The
Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 198–200 (1966).
285 Id. at 200.
286 Jerry M. Burger, The Foot-in-the-Door Compliance Procedure: A
Multiple-Process Analysis and Review, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 303
(1999); James P. Dillard, et al., Sequential-Request Persuasive Strategies: Meta-Analysis
of Foot-in-the Door and Door-in-the-Face, 10 HUM. COMM. RES. 461, 471 (1984) (Earlier
meta-analysis suggesting that evidence on this is mixed).
287 Some researchers and commentators have expressed doubts about this
explanation, noting skepticism as to whether a change in self-perception could be
triggered by complying with small requests of the kind used in FITD experiments. They
assert that a more plausible account is that compliance with an initial request activates
powerful attitudes (e.g. commitment to the subject matter of the request, a desire to
appear compassionate) that already exist in the subject. See Donald R. Gorassini and
James M. Olson, Does Self-Perception Change Explain the Foot-in-the Door Effect? 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91, 102 (1995).
288 Edward F. Fern et al., Effectiveness of Multiple Request Strategies: A Synthesis of
Research Results, 23 J. MARKETING RES. 144, 149 (1986).
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helpful) or that its effect is strongest when the requests are “prosocial” in
nature (altruistic, benefitting communities or non-profit enterprises, doing a
favor for a stranger, etc.).289

B. Door-in-the-Face (DITF)
Inviting rejection also seems to pay off. An early and often cited
experiment is representative of much of the research in this area: when
stopped on a university campus and asked whether they would chaperone
juvenile delinquents on a two-hour trip from their detention center to the
local zoo, 16.7% of subjects said yes. But when similar subjects had first
been asked (and had refused) to volunteer two years of time to serve as
counselors to such youth, a follow-up request for the two hours of
chaperoning resulted in a 50% compliance rate.290 Although most studies of
this phenomenon yield results of less dramatic magnitude (including some
showing no or even negative impact), meta-analyses of many studies over
three decades bear out the enhanced compliance produced by first asking for
more than you hope to attain.291
Further research in the intervening decades has refined these conclusions
in more and less predictable ways: while DITF can work in many settings
(including requests on behalf of arguably harmful organizations), 292 its
effects are larger where the request is for a socially useful purpose.293 DITF
also seems to work better when both requests are made by the same person,
face-to-face, will have the same beneficiary, and where the second request
follows the first without delay (defined as within 5 minutes). 294 But
289 Dillard, et al., supra note 286, at 477.
290 Robert B. Cialdini, et al., Reciprocal Concessions Procedure for Inducing

Compliance: The Door-in-the-Face Technique, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 206,
209 (1975).
291 See Daniel J. O’Keefe & Scott L. Hale, The Door-in-the-Face Influence
Strategy: A Random Effects Meta-Analytic Review, 21 COMM. YEARBOOK 1, 16 (1998)
[hereinafter, O’Keefe & Hale I].
292 See James Price Dillard & Jerold L. Hale, Prosocialness and Sequential Request
Compliance Techniques: Limits to the Foot-in-the-Door and the Door-in-the-Face?, 43
COMM. STUD. 220, 228 (1992). But see O’Keefe & Hale I, supra note 291, at 24 (no
measurable DITF effect where requests are not prosocial).
293 Dillard & Hale, supra note 292; O’Keefe & Hale I, supra note 291, at 24.
294 O’Keefe & Hale I, supra note 291, at 17. See also Daniel J. O’Keefe & Scott L.
Hale, An Odds-Ratio-Based Meta-Analysis of Research on the Door-in-the-Face Influence
Strategy, 14 COMM. REP. 31, 37 (2001) [hereinafter, “O’Keefe & Hale II”]. By contrast,
FITD seems to work even when there is substantial time delay between the initial and the
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interestingly, the size of the reduction between the initial, larger request and
the second, more moderate one does not seem to impact the DITF effect
dependably.295
How and why DITF works are potentially even more significant to those
seeking to persuade. The phenomenon was initially explained as an example
of the social norm of reciprocity: subjects complied with the second (smaller)
request in exchange for (i.e., to reciprocate for) the requester’s “concession”
from the first request, almost as if they were bargaining in a negotiation.296
However, more recent and comprehensive examination of DITF studies have
cast doubt on this explanation. The reciprocity rationale seems at odds with
the findings that (1) DITF effects are not influenced by the size of the second
request’s “concession”; and (2), that its effects are smaller when made on
behalf of different beneficiaries or where the interval between requests
exceeds a few minutes. The reciprocity explanation also does not account for
the increased effectiveness of DITF in prosocial request situations.297
More recent studies, based on surveys of the feelings experienced by
DITF subjects, have yielded a different explanation–one that is based on
guilt. The idea is that most people feel guilty when they (metaphorically)
slam the door in the face of someone who makes a request—particularly
(although not exclusively) one who is perceived as selfless or altruistic. This
causes them to want to assuage that feeling by complying with a second
request from the same person. Agreeing to the second request may be
motivated by the anticipation that it will produce a reduction of the guilt from
having turned down the initial request. 298 Although no one explanation has
been settled on, the guilt rationale has emerged as the most plausible.299

C. Mediation Applications and Questions
target request and the two requests are made by different people. See Burger, supra note
286.
295 O’Keefe & Hale I, supra note 291, at 18; O’Keefe & Hale II, supra
note 294, at 36.
296 See Cialdini et al., supra note 290, at 213–14.
297 See O’Keefe & Hale I, supra note 291, at 24. Another early hypothesis was that
the “perceptual contrast” from comparing the sizes of the larger first and smaller second
request makes the latter appear to be less onerous (and thus easier to accept) than if it
stood alone. But this (anchoring-like) explanation also seems incompatible with DITF
findings that assign significance to whether the same person makes both requests or
whether the request is altruistic in nature. Id.
298 Daniel J. O’Keefe & Marianne Figge, Guilt and Expected Guilt in the
Door-in-the-Face Technique, 66 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 312, 319–23 (1999).
299 O’Keefe and Hale I, supra note 291, at 25.

347

THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 28:2 2013]

The conditions under which this research has been conducted are far
removed from the world of disputing. What might one extrapolate from such
experiments when working with people in conflict?

1. Framing Offers and Concessions
A consistent theme running through this research is the impact of the
“prosocial-ness” of the requests on the rate of compliance produced. While
either form of sequential request (FITD or DITF) produces enhanced
compliance regardless of the nature of the request, both strategies are most
effective at reaching a target goal when subjects are asked to perform acts
that are seen as altruistic in nature.
Might this have implications for the mediation process? Can mediators
describe positional concessions and other demonstrations of flexibility by the
parties in mediation as altruistic acts? Might early procedural agreements—
for that matter, even the initial agreement to take part in mediation—be
framed as instances of the parties’ better nature, so as to encourage
FITD-type changes in self-perception?
What of agreements that involve a softening of position: the warring
neighbor who is asked to be the first to wave the olive branch, despite no
guarantee that the gesture will be reciprocated; the company executive who,
instead of continuing to press a strong defense to a claim of product liability
instead decides to act in a socially responsible manner and change the
product design? Each of these concessions might be framed by the mediator
in either self-serving or altruistic terms. 300 Do some neutrals miss an
opportunity to achieve resolutions by only emphasizing how making
concessions will advance the parties’ own self-interests? Should mediators
(paradoxically) underscore the giving–and not just the getting–in mediation?
301 This would be a fertile area to test by research based in actual mediation
300 The distinction between selfish and selfless is a fine one. It can be argued that

even the most altruistic of acts serves to satisfy a person’s own needs, albeit the need to
benefit others. And concessions in mediation can always be seen as being given in return
for getting something—at a minimum, the enhanced likelihood of the end of conflict.
301 Expressing demonstrable gratitude (social approval) for a party’s initial
helpfulness and cooperation may pay dividends. FITD research has shown that subjects
who receive extended appreciation for agreeing to perform a small favor comply with a
subsequent larger request more generously than those who had simply been “thanked” for
the initial favor. Donald R. Gorassini & James M. Olson, supra note 288, at 95. In the
same vein, the research suggests that concessions potentially viewed by offerors as
“submissive” acts would better be re-framed by mediators as “helpful” gestures. Id.
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settings.

2. Orchestrating the Bargaining
As experienced neutrals know, many mediated disputes are exercises in
zero-sum, adversarial bargaining from start to end. Even the most
cooperative, interest-based negotiations often involve issues that are
bargained over competitively. 302 Such settlement discussions, usually
seeking a compromise through incremental convergence of party positions,
are often conducted through caucused shuttle diplomacy. This research may
point to new ways of thinking about such caucuses.
First, many neutrals who find themselves orchestrating a competitive
bargaining process through private meetings routinely choose simply to carry
offers from party to party, verbatim, perhaps adding a note or signal of their
own impression of the likelihood of future movement.303 The lessons of this
research could be seen as pointing to a different approach—one in which the
mediator displaces the parties as the focus of the bargaining.304 With the
mediator operating as the (party-authorized) source of all proposals, he or she
can make throwaway (small or large) first requests and frame and time
follow-up requests geared to yielding subsequent agreement to a settlement
target within the range defined by the parties’ confidential instructions.305
Second, this empirical literature may be instructive for more
conventional orchestration of bargaining by the parties themselves or for
process management by the neutral. The lessons of DITF may provide
support for the neutral’s encouraging some parties to be less, rather than
more, reasonable with their initial offers or demands–in order to harness the
302 See James J. White, The Pros and Cons of “Getting to Yes”, 34 J. LEGAL ED. 115,

116 (1984).
303 See Dwight Golann, How to Borrow a Mediator’s Powers, 30 LITIGATION 41, 44
(Spring 2004) (contending that some lawyers view this as the mediator’s role).
304 This is hardly a radical notion and may already be typical of late stages of
caucused bargaining. For example, mediators who launch their own “trial balloons” to
avoid party reactive devaluation of offers—are—in essence, doing this.
305 Such a lesson might offend critics on a normative level. With all of the
bargaining information reposing in the neutral, notions of party control and
self-determination may be compromised and impartiality sacrificed to the overarching
desire to find a deal. Moreover a neutral’s consciously seeking to create (and then
exploit) a sense of obligation or guilt might seem highly problematic. But, so long as the
parties cede such control willingly, might not such mediator interventions serve as a
needed antidote to the strategic, psychological, and cognitive barriers that can otherwise
deprive the parties of the resolution they came to mediation to achieve?
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power of a sequence that starts with a rejection. Or FITD may suggest the
wisdom of seeking compliance with benign, process-oriented requests (e.g.
as to ground rules, agenda setting, or staying at the table despite doubts or
anger) in order to induce changes in self-perception that might pay dividends
in cooperation when problem-solving and bargaining begin.
Of course the research we are discussing may not lend a theoretical
foundation for any such conclusions. Would these same experimental results
have been obtained if subjects were emotionally (or strategically) in conflict
with the person making requests of them? Would sequential request
strategies that have been demonstrated to be effective in two (experimental)
rounds work if—as in many tough mediations—more (sometimes many
more) than two rounds of offers and concessions are involved? Or would
other cognitive or affective processes take over? And even as to two-round
sequences, how many times can they be used with one subject in one sitting?
If FITD works to achieve early stage procedural agreements (e.g. to proceed
with the process and then to honor a set of ground rules), will it be effective
again in seeking positional movement toward settlement from the same
party? Experiments conducted under mediation conditions might shed light
on such questions.

IX. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have surveyed social science research findings bearing
on both direct and indirect modes of persuasion, and have raised questions
about whether and how this empirical research might apply to the work of
mediators. We have also identified several gaps in the research that seem
worthy of further study. At the risk of oversimplifying, the research seems to
show that: counter-attitudinal advocacy, or role reversal, works as a mode of
influence, potentially producing lasting changes in attitudes. However, where
subjects have deeply held beliefs about the topic being addressed, those
changes are likely to be slow and incremental.
Receiving a full and apparently sincere apology has strong and
significant effects on the attitudes of apology recipients, including, in the
settlement context, their (but not their lawyers’) willingness to accept
settlement offers. Researchers have devoted virtually no attention to the
potential persuasive effects of making amends on apologizers themselves.
Claims that group brainstorming produces a) more or better ideas, b)
better decisions, or c) greater group cohesion are not directly borne out by
social science research. Indeed, the research demonstrates that individuals
produce more and better ideas when working alone than when working in
groups. With respect to decisionmaking, little empirical attention has been
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CHANGING MINDS

paid to how groups choose from ideas that have been generated. Prisoner’s
dilemma experiments and studies having to do with race relations and other
relations between “in-groups” and “out-groups” strongly suggest positive and
lasting effects of induced cooperation in reducing conflict.
When it comes to direct modes of persuasion, the research suggests that
asking questions—at least highly suggestive rhetorical questions—can be
less persuasive than making corresponding direct statements. When making
direct statements, explicit, two-sided, “refutational” statements—providing
specific, detailed, substantively-grounded reasons why one argument or
course of action is superior to another—are the most persuasive message
form.
Both fear appeals and guilt appeals can be highly persuasive, although
these two modes of influence work in different ways. Persuasive messages
that induce fear work most effectively when they convey both serious danger
and strong, feasible ways of coping with it. Such threat-based messages seem
to trigger thoughtful appraisal instead of mere emotion, which can neutralize
defensive avoidance mechanisms that may otherwise interfere with the
rational weighing of alternatives. Unlike fear appeals, guilt appeals are most
persuasive when carried out in moderation. Strong, explicit guilt messages
may produce reactance and anger on the part of the subject and therefore may
be counterproductive.
Finally, research suggests that those who seek to extract a specific
concession from a subject would do better to use a sequence of requests
(starting with less or more than is sought) than to ask for the target outright.
Moreover, a pattern of gradual concessions is likely to be fostered where the
subject feels that his movement is a helpful, prosocial act.
Of necessity, almost all of this research views each form of persuasion
under study in isolation. By contrast, mediators in challenging matters rarely
have only one persuasive intervention to choose from at any given juncture.
Rather, they can choose from a menu of options and must often employ
multiple persuasion approaches, under time pressure, to produce progress.
Helpful as what we have reported may be, data on the comparative and
sequential effectiveness of two or more persuasion options would be even
more useful.
Some of what succeeds in persuading in a laboratory setting—for
example role reversal and receiving apologies—seems unsurprising and easy
to square with mainstream mediation thinking. Other social science
findings—about, e.g., idea generation in group brainstorming or asking
questions rather than making statements in order to encourage
re-examination—seem to call into question, at least at first blush,
conventional mediation wisdom and practice. How certain persuasion modes
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seem to work—for example, rhetorical questions serving to distract and
feeling pressuring, concessions flowing out of cooperative self-perceptions
and altruistic motives—may shed new light on both skills and normative
debates among mediators. Indeed, some of this research, e.g., showing that
appeals to fear can enhance logical thinking or that explicit, detailed
messages persuade best, may have considerable significance for such
longstanding debates as the relative merits of facilitative versus evaluative
mediation and the importance of a mediator’s having substantive (as well as
process) expertise.
Does the world of mediation resemble the laboratory? Superficially, of
course not. Static, one-shot, questionnaire-based surveys of college student
or working mother subjects seem a far cry from competitive and emotional
interactions among mediators and disputants. But on closer examination, the
difference may not be so great: at least some of the data reported is based on
the responses of addicted smokers, students self-interested in avoiding an
onerous examination, people of strong religious conviction or racial
prejudice—in short, people harboring entrenched attitudes and desires that
may be comparable to the mind set of the most intransigent of legal
disputants. Nevertheless, the field of mediation would greatly benefit from
empirical research on persuasion specifically in the mediation context.
Throughout this article, we have tried to identify fertile areas for such further
study.
Even with its limitations, we believe that the social science findings
reported in this article, taken as a whole, may have broad significance for
mediation trainers and practitioners, as well as for the administration of civil
justice. It is now likely that the number of civil legal matters submitted to and
resolved through mediation greatly exceeds the dwindling number of cases
resolved by trial each year. Despite the exponential growth in the use of
mediation in the past quarter century, the field still operates to a substantial
degree on untested claims and ideologies. If mediation is to become fully
professionalized, it needs to overcome its squeamishness about the topic of
persuasion. It needs to base its best practices and ethical norms on more than
folklore, opinion or the official imprimatur of dispute resolution
organizations. It needs reliable, evidence-based knowledge about what kinds
of mediator interventions work in producing settlements, and how they are
experienced by people in disputes.
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